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ABSTRACT
Human behavior and decision-making depend largely on past experiences that generate
specific action patterns (i.e., scripts, Gioia & Manz, 1985) for specific situations. In an ideal
world, in which changes in the environment do not conflict with these action patterns, humans
would be able to operate consistently, efficiently, and automatically. However, real-world
environments are dynamic and fluid, thus altering behavior and forcing changes in scripts.
Research suggests that to implement alternate solutions to changing situations, humans select
from a “library” of learned scripts. Since humans tend to implement scripts to the degree that
these are successful over a period of time, implementing alternate scripts can be difficult. That is,
unless one has the cognitive flexibility to adapt scripts, implementing a new solution to a problem
can be difficult and/or unsuccessful. Cognitive flexibility allows one to restructure knowledge to
form an adaptive response to changes set forth by the environment.
At issue is the difference between possessing a repertoire of scripts that can be selected
and implemented to solve a problem, and having the cognitive flexibility to effectively switch
between scripts when a change in context occurs. The purpose of this dissertation is to: (a)
evaluate the effectiveness of possessing alternate scripts to respond to situations, and (b) assess
the effectiveness of cognitive flexibility training on the ability to switch between scripts. The
ultimate goal is to improve mental flexibility in situations where a specific approach should be
revised and adjusted to conform to changes in context. A total of 48 participants were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (number of scripts) x 2 (training present or absent)
design: (a) single script, (b) single script and cognitive flexibility training, (c) two scripts, and (d)
two scripts and cognitive flexibility training. Participants either learned one script or two scripts
iii

on how to respond to a car engine overheat. In addition, depending on the study condition,
participants completed a cognitive flexibility training that used a mental simulation approach.
The cognitive flexibility training was intended to allow participants to imagine a number of
different scenarios that may impact that task, evaluate assumptions, check assumptions against
the situation, imagine a response to such scenarios, and review the effectiveness of the developed
solutions. The results of this research suggested that for situations requiring a change or an
adaptation to an alternate script, possessing two scripts facilitated correct decision-making,
whereas cognitive flexibility training may have hindered decision-making. In addition, for
situations requiring a standard script, possessing two scripts was detrimental to decision-making
performance, regardless of cognitive flexibility training. Theoretical implications in terms of
script-processing and cognitive flexibility, as well as practical implications for training design
are provided.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Human behavior and decision-making depend largely on past experiences that generate
specific action patterns (i.e., scripts, Gioia & Manz, 1985) for specific situations. In an ideal
world, in which changes in the environment do not conflict with these action patterns, humans
would be able to operate consistently, efficiently, and automatically. However, real-world
environments are dynamic and fluid, thus requiring the alteration of behavior and forcing
changes in action patterns. For instance, a driver can identify the easiest and most efficient path
to get to and from work. This path may be used continuously over time, until a change in the
environment (e.g., roadblock, road closure, or construction) forces the driver to change the
typical action pattern or script. That is, the change in the environment should prompt the
individual to recognize that a change has occurred, and an alternative solution should be
implemented.
Research suggests that to implement alternate solutions, experts select from a pre-set
“library” of learned experiences that can be matched to a current situation (Klein, 1998). As a
result, this repertoire of mental representations (i.e., scripts) facilitates adaptation to changes set
by the environment. That is, the more scripts one has, the more options are available for
responses and decision-making (Kochan, 2005). Others, however, have argued that the complex
nature of dynamic environments can make the implementation of “precompiled” scripts
inappropriate (Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson, & Coulson, 1991). In addition, studies have found that
experts have more difficulty in adapting to changes in comparison to novices due to an increase
in the “strength” of their actual scripts (Kochan, 2005). In fact, studies by Meyer, Reisenzein,
1

and Schützwohl (1997) and Schützwohl (1998) found that the more successful a solution is in a
given environment, the more difficult it becomes to revise it when a change in the environment
occurs; especially if the change is task-relevant. For instance, the action script for uphill parking
(on the right of the street) requires one to turn the front wheels away from the curb (i.e., turn the
steering wheel to the left) so that the rear part of the tires can rest against the curb, using it as a
block to prevent the car from rolling into traffic. If the action script in this example is performed
successfully over a period of time, the script for uphill parking becomes stronger (i.e., every time
uphill parking is required, the same script will be implemented). However, if the same situation
occurs without a curb in place, the action of turning the wheels away from the curb ceases to
work. If this script is implemented in this alternate scenario, the car is likely to roll into traffic
because the tires are not resting against a block. Instead, the correct action in this situation is to
turn the front wheels towards the right so that if the car were to roll back, it would roll away
from traffic. The continual use of the same script when a change in context has occurred is
related to maladaptive routines (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006), which are behavior sequences that
were at one point in time efficient solutions to a problem but became inefficient when the
problem was presented in a different context.
As shown above, in daily life situations, humans are likely to implement solutions to the
degree to which these solutions have been successful over time. As such, when changes in
context occur, it becomes more difficult to switch to alternate solutions because an overreliance
towards a standard solution has been developed. One key component of optimal decision-making
is the ability to recognize a change, and having the cognitive flexibility to adapt scripts in order to
implement a new solution to a problem. Cognitive flexibility has been defined as the ability to
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“restructure one's knowledge, in many ways, in adaptive response to radically changing
situational demands” (Spiro & Jehng, 1990, p. 165). Put more simply, cognitive flexibility is “the
human ability to adapt cognitive processing strategies to new and unexpected conditions in the
environment” (Cañas, Antolí, Fajardo, & Salmerón, 2005, p. 95). At issue is the difference
between possessing a repertoire of scripts from which to select one and implement it to solve a
problem, and the ability to effectively switch between scripts when a change in context occurs.
That is, how useful is it to possess a repertoire of scripts if the flexibility to switch from one to
another does not exist? In addition, if a repertoire of scripts does not exist, can cognitive
flexibility training facilitate the restructuring of a current script as a solution to match the
changing demands of the environment? Reder and Schunn (1999) have found that better
performance in dynamic environments is achieved by having the flexibility to adapt strategies to
changes in the environment, and not by possessing a repertoire of strategies. Only a limited
amount of research has attempted to understand this issue, and research has yet to investigate the
relationship between scripts and cognitive flexibility. As such, the following research questions
are put forth:
(RQ1) Does possessing a repertoire of scripts facilitate adaptation to changes in the
environment if cognitive flexibility training is provided (i.e., if the ability to switch between
these scripts is learned)?
(RQ2) Is simply owning one script and having an understanding that the script may fail,
or may need to be revised in a different context (through cognitive flexibility training), enough to
avoid overreliance to one standard solution?
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(RQ3) What is the cost of cognitive flexibility? Could switching ability negatively affect
decision-making when a standard script is required (no switch needed)?
Purpose of this Study
To address the aforementioned research questions, this study investigated the relationship
between the theories of script-processing and cognitive flexibility. To this end, I chose scriptprocessing theory since it involves mental knowledge structures that play a large role in
activating specific behaviors that are then applied to certain situations (Abelson, 1981). When
scripts for certain types of situations are not available, adequate response behaviors may not be
elicited. If, however, alternate scripts are stored in memory, an individual may be able to select
an appropriate response. As such, it is expected that learning additional alternate scripts can
influence adaptation to changes in the environment. In addition, it is expected that cognitive
flexibility training will facilitate the ability to effectively switch between scripts and, as a result,
avoid intransigence towards alternate, more appropriate solutions.
The idea behind cognitive flexibility is that “revisiting the same material, at different
times, in rearranged contexts, for different purposes, and from different conceptual perspectives
is essential for attaining the goals of advanced knowledge acquisition” (Spiro, Feltovich,
Jacobson, & Coulson, 1992, p. 65). One cost-effective method to achieve cognitive flexibility is
to train using mental simulation. Mental simulation refers to the mental act of simulating events,
either in the past or in the future, for planning or problem solving purposes (Taylor & Schneider,
1989). Not to be confused with mental practice which focuses on the rehearsal of a response
action without the use of body movements (Richardson, 1969), mental simulation allows for “the
construction of hypothetical scenarios and the reconstruction of real ones” (Taylor & Pham,
4

1994, p. 219). That is, mental simulation allows an individual to anticipate the future (i.e.,
imagine what and how something will happen in the future), such as anticipating sports matches
or business meetings (Sanna, 2000). Mental simulation has shown benefits in areas such as
education (Pham & Taylor, 1997), motor behavior (Decety & Ingvar, 1990; Decety, Jeannerod,
Durozard, & Baverel, 1993), and naturalistic decision-making (Klein, 1998). To train for
cognitive flexibility, this study used a type of mental simulation that asked participants to
imagine that a specific script has failed (i.e., premortem method, Klein, 2007), and thus force
them to generate plausible reasons for why the script failed. As a result, cognitive flexibility
training should allow participants to mentally visualize a script from different perspectives and
contexts, and improve their ability to recognize the need to switch to an alternative script when
changes in the environment prompt a change in behavior.
In summary, the purpose of this dissertation was to: (a) evaluate the effectiveness of
possessing alternate scripts to respond to situations, and (b) assess the effectiveness of cognitive
flexibility training on the ability to switch between scripts. The ultimate goal was to improve
mental flexibility in situations where a specific approach should be revised and adjusted to
conform to changes in context.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
To provide further clarity on the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, I next discuss
the constructs of scripts, cognitive flexibility, and mental simulation in more detail. In the
literature, these constructs may possess multiple connotations. Therefore, the definitions and
information provided in the following paragraphs are intended to represent the context and scope
of this dissertation. First, I discuss the theory of script-processing and its implications on
response behaviors. Second, I discuss the theory of cognitive flexibility and how it can be
implemented as a means of training in the form of mental simulation to facilitate script switching
when changes in context occur.
Script-Processing Theory
In the literature, the terms schemas, mental models, and scripts are used to describe
mental knowledge structures that are used to organize and interpret information received from
the environment. However, a closer look into these concepts reveals that although related, there
are some fine distinctions between them. A schema is an individual’s knowledge structure which
is activated by a stimulus and helps comprehend current situations/events (Meyer et al., 1991;
Rumelhart, 1984). Mental models involve conceptual representations that support knowledge
about how a system or situation works (Sein & Bostrom, 1989). This understanding allows
humans to make predictions about the future states of the system or situation (Gentner, 2002;
Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992). In contrast to schemas and mental models, scripts are
defined as conceptual representations of event sequences held in memory that are activated for
specific behaviors that are appropriate for specific situations (Abelson, 1981; Gioia & Poole,
1984). Gioia and Poole argued that, in contrast to schemas (which interpret information, actions,
6

and expectations), scripts allow individuals to understand situations and provide a guide on how
to behave appropriately in a situation. For example, during takeoff, pilots invoke a “climb to an
initial altitude” schema. This event has not yet occurred, but it is expected to happen at some
point during takeoff. Thus, the action of setting an altitude becomes a script that is activated once
the aircraft is ascending. Given that the purpose of this dissertation is to understand how humans
behave when environmental changes occur, scripts were chosen as the construct of study.
As mentioned before, scripts are conceptual representations that are activated to guide
behavior in specific situations (Gioia & Poole, 1984; Gioia & Manz, 1985). As such, scriptprocessing theory has been used in cognitive psychology to explain how behavior is guided
based on a certain stimulus (Anderson, 1983; Gioia & Poole, 1984). Abelson (1981) argued that
scripted behavior occurs when: (a) an individual has a stable cognitive representation of a
particular script (based on previous experiences), (b) an evoking context for the script exists (i.e.,
a stimulus), and (c) the individual “enters” the script (i.e., decides to use the script). For instance,
a morning drive to work may invoke a variety of scripts, depending upon how early/late one is
for work. Based on previous experiences the individual has a stable cognitive representation on
which streets, lanes, or back roads are the most efficient to ensure on-time arrival to work. In this
example, on-time arrival to work is the evoking context that activates the script for the most
efficient path to work. The individual then decides on which script to use by selecting the
appropriate script for the situation, and consequently behaves in a manner that conforms to the
appropriate action. If the traffic route in this script unexpectedly deviates from that cognitive
representation (e.g., roadblocks, traffic accidents, weather conditions), the script may need to be
revised.
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Scripts and the RPD Model
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision-making (Klein, 1989, 1998;
Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein & Crandall, 1995) is a descriptive model
that explains how experts are able to make decisions without comparing different options.
According to the model, decisions are based on recognition by merging the processes of
situational assessment and mental simulation (see Figure 1). That is, experts are able to assess a
situation by generating a most feasible action sequence based on experience (i.e., scripts held in
memory).
According to Klein and colleagues, the RPD model consists of three variations of
decision-making. Variation 1 involves a simple case in which an event is recognized and a
response is rapidly implemented (i.e., recognition match). Specifically, Variation 1 illustrates an
instance in which a skilled decision-maker recognizes a situation to be one that was experienced
in the past (i.e., scripts already stored in long-term memory). Thus, in this case, if an event is
judged to be familiar or routine, the decision is quick and automatic (Phillips, Klein, & Sieck,
2004). However, not all events are familiar, as the environment can be presented in a different,
unfamiliar context. This is the case in Variation 2, in which the decision maker needs additional
information to understand the current situation because the situation may have not matched a
typical situation already stored in memory (i.e., script not available). In these situations, humans
tend to interrupt their responses to think about the situation, and generate a solution to the new
problem. When a solution cannot be formulated and a script cannot be retrieved, humans may
experience states of confusion or “cognitive freeze.” I describe the phenomenon of “cognitive
freeze” and its relationship to scripts in the next section.
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Figure 1. The RPD Model (adapted from Phillips et al., 2004).
Scripts and Cognitive Freeze
Changes in the environment can also block the ability to think and therefore respond
effectively. In these cases, humans may experience “cognitive freeze,” which refers to an
individual’s inability to retrieve an appropriate script that provides a solution to an unexpected
and/or an emergency situation (Delahaij, Gaillard, & Soeters, 2006). In response to emergency
situations, for instance, the human tendency to “cognitively freeze” involves a neuro-cognitive
function, as well as a time required to process the steps between perception of the event and
correct selection of response (Leach, 2004). Leach stated that the more complex a cognitive task
is, the more neural support is needed, and hence, the longer will be the cognitive processing time.
To decrease cognitive processing time, individuals should have prepared responses that
are based on what they have learned through training or past experiences. In turn, these
9

experiences can lead to faster selection of scripts and/or response sets. Conversely, individuals
who do not have pre-set responses will need to create new scripts while simultaneously facing an
emergency situation, and thus this prolongs effective responses necessary for survival (Leach,
2004). Leach proposed that during unexpected situations, response outcomes vary according to
these three conditions: (a) if an appropriate response/script has already been created, previously
prepared, and/or trained, responses can be delivered quickly (100 ms), (b) if various
responses/scripts are available, selecting the correct behavior can take up to 1-2 s, and (c) if no
responses/scripts exist in one’s cognitive database, then a new script must be created, which can
take up to 8 s to 10 s under “optimal circumstances,” or longer, during more severe conditions.
When scripts are not available, the human physiological response can therefore result in the state
of being stunned, shocked, freeze, or cognitively paralyzed.
Scripts stored in a mental database need, therefore, to match the required behavior based
on a specific situation. Typically, the environment requires a standard script, which is defined as
the consistent script normally implemented in a given situation. However, decisions can be
altered given the situational requirements set by the environment. That is, although a standard
script is typically the one required, changes in the environment may prompt the implementation
of an alternate script (i.e., a switch to an alternate script). Possessing both a standard script and
an alternate script can aid decision-making when a change in script is required. Nevertheless,
possessing both types of scripts can interfere in situations where just the standard script is
required since the incorrect script may be selected. Based on this logic, the following hypothesis
is put forth:
Hypothesis 1. There will be an interaction between script quantity and situational
requirement (standard script vs. alternate script). Specifically, participants who learn two scripts
10

(standard and alternate) will perform better on test items that require a switch to an alternate
script than participants who learn a single script. In contrast, participants who learn a single
script will perform better on test items that require maintaining a standard script.
In summary, scripts are conceptual representations of action sequences that are activated
based on a stimulus, and therefore help us guide behavior. The larger the script database, the
more automatically a situation is judged as familiar. When a script is not available, the individual
must then revise the current script or create a new script which could prolong responses
execution. As such, possessing a database of scripts gives one the ability to quickly match a
script to a situation.
Cognitive Flexibility
As noted in the previous section, individuals possess scripts that guide actions in a given
context. Having many scripts stored in one’s memory database can be beneficial in situations
where a relevant change in context has occurred and an appropriate alternate script is available to
be selected from the mental database. However, having a large database of scripts is only helpful
if one has the ability to effectively switch to a correct alternate script, as switching to an incorrect
script could yield an unwanted outcome. Therefore, individuals who have the ability to correctly
switch to an alternate script or adapt one script to form a new solution are more “cognitive
flexible” when it comes to responding to situations that change in context.
Cognitive flexibility is defined as having the mental capacity to rapidly revise a response
in order to adapt to unforeseen situations (Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich, & Anderson, 1988). That is,
humans who are cognitively flexible can “restructure … [their] knowledge, in many ways, in
adaptive response to radically changing situational demands” (Spiro & Jehng, 1990, p. 165).
11

Before discussing cognitive flexibility in more detail, it is necessary to briefly mention that the
concept is related to adaptive flexibility (Duchesne, 1997), adaptive expertise (Hatano & Inagaki,
1981), and the theory of cognitive transformation (Klein & Baxter, 2006).
Adaptive flexibility is the ability to respond flexibly to change (Kolb, 1984). Individuals
who are high in adaptive flexibility are labeled as “adaptive experts.” Adaptive experts are
readily able to adapt to changing environmental demands (Duchesne, 1997). That is, they have
the ability to easily solve previously encountered problems and generate solutions to new
problems (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). This is different from routine expertise, which is the ability
to automatically execute standard procedures in a given task. For example, Hatano and Inagaki
(1986) discussed how, in home cooking, an individual can become a routine expert by using the
same standard materials described in a recipe to make a dinner. However, when these materials
are not available, a routine expert may not know how to adapt the routine based on the materials
that are available at that given time. As such, according to Hatano and Inagaki, when a skill is
developed through the repetitive application of a standard procedure, adaptive expertise is not
achieved. In contrast, if the skill is repeatedly applied with variations (i.e., situational
randomness), it is more likely to lead to adaptive expertise. Based on these definitions, adaptive
flexibility and adaptive expertise are essentially the same as cognitive flexibility, except that
adaptive expertise is more focused on how experts adapt to changes.
Cognitive transformation theory centers on shedding mental models and adopting new
ones, instead of adding more knowledge to an individual’s cognitive database (Klein & Baxter,
2006). Klein and Baxter suggested that mental models get “harder” to disconfirm as one
develops more expertise. When anomalies occur, individuals need to shed these “hard” mental
models and transform them with new ones. As such, previous mental models can act as barriers
12

to understanding changes in situations, resulting in mental inflexibility. Instead of scripts,
cognitive transformation theory is more focused on mental models and, therefore, I chose not to
utilize the theory for this study.
Cognitive Flexibility: Background
Research on cognitive flexibility dates back to the 1940s, and focused initially on one’s
inability to modify thought processes even when more adequate solutions were available (also
called the Einstellungs-effects). The Einstellung-effects were investigated by Luchins (1942) and
Luchins and Luchins (1959), by having individuals solve water jug problems. The studies
showed that after experiencing a successful solution to a series of problems, individuals
continued to use the same solution even when simpler solutions were available to new problems.
Individuals who show an ability to revise their solutions are identified as cognitively flexible,
and they typically use inductive reasoning, think “outside-the-box,” and tend to be more creative
in generating solutions (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2011; Guilford, 1959).
Cognitive flexibility has been studied extensively in child development, in order to
explore differences in cognitive development and to understand at what age children become
more mentally flexible (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008; Deak, 2003). For instance, the Dimensional
Change Card Sorting Task (DCCS) is designed for children, and its purpose is to have children
sort cards based on different dimensions. First, children are asked to sort the cards based on a
single dimension (e.g., color). Sequentially, the children are asked to sort the cards based on
another dimension such as shape (Müller, Steven Dick, Gela, Overton, & Zelazo, 2006). When it
comes to sorting the cards based on the new dimension (shape), three-year-old children are
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unable to make the switch, while five-year-olds are able to switch to the new dimension
(Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003).
In addition to child development, cognitive flexibility has also been explored in clinical
psychology as being a factor in mental health issues such as autism (Van Eylen et al., 2011),
eating disorders (Tchanturia et al., 2012), schizophrenia (Delahunty, Morice, & Frost, 1993), and
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006).
Individuals with these mental health issues have been found to not have the flexibility to switch
based on changing task demands. That is, these individuals tend to remain stuck in one task, and
cannot allocate attention to changes in that task. Typically, card sorting tasks are used to assess
the relationship between cognitive flexibility and these mental health issues. For instance, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) developed by Berg (1948) assesses someone’s ability to
adjust to altered rules by sorting cards according to dimensions. As described by Anderson,
Damasio, Jones, and Tranel (1991), participants have to adapt their responses to the unexpected
change in principle. Typically, individuals who struggle to adapt to the changes in principle are
less cognitively flexible than the ones who can quickly adapt, change the strategy, and correctly
sort the cards based on the new principle (even when the old strategy was successful over time).
Therefore, this type of test can be used as a tool to measure if someone has the ability to adapt to
changing situations in comparison to others.
Cognitive Flexibility and Script Strength
As alluded to before, humans typically rely on past successful experiences to guide
action, and, therefore, they may exhibit a tendency to implement a solution even when that
solution ceases to be correct (i.e., overreliance towards a standard solution). As a result, due to
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the past success of a solution, the script becomes stronger, making it more difficult to revise
when a change in the environment occurs. The phenomenon of script strength has been studied
as a function of schemata, but the task discussed in these studies prompted participants to elicit a
specific action based on a shown stimulus, and thus has also implications for scripts.
A script’s strength tends to increase to the degree to which it has been implemented
successfully in the past. Research on this concept has been conducted based on building a
specific schema over a number of trials. Although the following studies evaluated response
times based on schemata, the results have implications for script-processing. In their laboratorybased study, Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph, and Schützwohl (1991) asked participants to determine the
position of a dot (relevant stimulus), which would appear either above or below two words
(distractors). These words appeared simultaneously, one above the other, with the dot appearing
at different intervals. If the dot appeared above the upper word, participants were instructed to
click the left key on the keyboard. If the dot appeared below the word, participants were
instructed to click the right key on the keyboard (action script). During the first 29 trials, the
words appeared on a white background with black color font, which was to create a consistent
schema of how words and dots would appear. Then, to produce a schema-discrepant event, the
next trial (i.e., trial 30) presented one of the words in a photo-negative presentation, that is in
white color font on a black background. Results indicated that the change in context (i.e., in this
case, the white word on a black background) led to delays in reaction time (even when the
change was task-irrelevant, i.e., the changed occurred to the distractor items). Meyer et al.
suggested that response time delays were due to participants analyzing the situation to decide if
the change in context influenced their schema.
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In a follow-up study, Meyer et al. (1997) used the same method as that described above
(Meyer et al., 1991), except that the relevant stimulus (i.e., the dot) was manipulated to present a
change in context (i.e., change was task-relevant). After 31 trials of participants responding to a
black dot on a white background, participants were presented with a white dot on a black
background. Results indicated that participants had a more pronounced response time delay in
the trial in which the relevant stimuli was manipulated, as compared to an equivalent change in a
distractor stimulus. These two studies show that after building and successfully implementing a
specific schema over time, the strength of that schema increases. In turn, the strength of the
schema delays responses to the changes, especially if the changes are task-relevant. Schützwohl
(1998) corroborated these results, as he also found that participants who possessed strong
schemata took longer to respond to an ongoing activity when an unexpected event occurred. As
such, Schützwohl argued that the ability to rapidly switch schemata is contingent on the strength
of the activated schema.
The aforementioned studies investigated response times based on schemata, but the
results have implications for script-processing. It can be argued that a script was formed once the
participants learned they needed to press a key every time a stimulus was presented. In turn, a
script was created that triggered the action of pressing a key each time the stimulus was present.
In all, if the participants had the flexibility to switch scripts and adapt to the unfamiliar situation,
interruption delays would be less likely to occur. The ability to continually evaluate an event and
revise action scripts is necessary towards successful adaptation to changes in the environment
(Kochan, 2005).
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In a similar context, studies have found that the strength of a set routine also influences
flexibility and adaptation. Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, and Fiedler (2001) manipulated
decision routines in a micro-world simulation in which participants learned to developed a weak
or strong routine. During learning, strong routines were developed after implementing a specific
routine for 30 times, and weak routines were developed after implementing a specific routine for
15 times. The results showed that during testing, participants who developed a strong routine
were less likely to adapt to changes in the environment that demanded a deviation from the
current routine. In contrast, participants in the weak routine were less likely to maintain the
learned routine, and were able to switch to a different routine based on the environmental
changes.
Besides routines, researchers have explored the difficulty of adapting strategies to
changes in situations. For instance, Bröder and Schiffer (2006) utilized a hypothetical stock
market game, in which participants developed decision strategies. A change in payoff structure
occurred after 80 decision trials, which should have prompted participants to switch their
strategy and adapt to a more optimal strategy. The results indicated that when the change in
payoff structure occurred, participants continued to rely on the success of the strategy used at the
beginning of the task, even when the strategy ceased to be optimal. In related research, Cañas,
Quesada, Antolí, and Fajardo (2003) investigated cognitive flexibility when developing a
successful strategy in a complex problem-solving task. The results showed that after developing
a successful strategy in consecutive trials, performance decreased when a change in the
environment demanded an adjustment to the strategy. Furthermore, they found that performance
decreased when the changes in the environment were relevant to the problem-solving strategy
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developed. As such, it is likely that if participants were high in cognitive flexibility, they would
be able to switch strategies based on environmental demands.
Cognitive Flexibility Training
The idea behind training is to learn new skills with the intent to apply them to specific
contexts. Training is said to transfer when the learned skills and knowledge are maintained and
generalized over a period of time (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). Furthermore, the trained
skills and knowledge form scripts about how to respond to different situations. Realistically, the
environment in which these scripts are applied can be unpredictable, and if the learned scripts are
not adapted within that environment, performance can suffer. For instance, Cañas, Antolí,
Fajardo, and Salmerón (2005) explored the effects of training on cognitive flexibility. In their
study, participants were assigned to one of two training conditions: (a) constant training
conditions (training in situations where no environmental changes occur), and (b) variable
training condition (training in which exposure the parameters of the task constantly changed). It
was expected that the participants in the constant training condition would have difficulty
adapting to environmental changes presented in later trials, and show a tendency to continue to
use the same strategy developed in earlier trials. Since participants in the variable condition were
trained in variable environmental conditions, they were expected to have difficulties in
developing a specific strategy. As a result, this lead to easier adaptation to new environmental
conditions presented during later trials. The results showed that when training under constant
conditions, participants were inflexible towards adapting their strategies (maintained their
original developed strategy), while training under variable conditions facilitated the switch from
one strategy to another. This finding is congruent to arguments by Hatano and Inagaki (1986)
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and Spiro et al. (1992), who stated that if a skill is repeatedly applied with variations (i.e., at
different times, in rearranged contexts, and from different perspectives), it is more likely to lead
to adaptive abilities.
Premortem Mental Simulation as a Tool for Cognitive Flexibility Training
Mental simulation is an approach in which the pre-enactment of events takes place in the
mind. That is, mental simulation calls upon the use of one’s imagination to represent a past or
future event unfolding over time. The term imagination refers to the capability of an individual to
engage in mental activities that are necessary in order to visualize actions over a time continuum
(Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). For example, an athlete can use imagination to mentally
visualize scoring a game-winning goal; a writer can imagine finishing a most anticipated
manuscript; whereas a pilot can imagine the next procedural steps during aircraft descent. In fact,
people tend to rehearse future events while engaged in routine activities such as showering,
driving, or eating (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) explained that
mental simulation gives one the ability to “mutate” or substitute an outcome with a hypothetical
alternative outcome. This ability serves to modify the outcomes of past events into other
differing outcomes (Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Likewise, this ability can be used to modify
events that have yet to occur by providing a desirable outcome, or enabling a set of possibilities
about the outcomes in a distant future (Taylor et al., 1998).
A pre-mortem mental simulation is an exercise technique in which mental simulation is
used to improve decision-making, by imagining that a certain plan has failed (Klein, 2007). The
idea focuses on generating plausible reasons for why a plan failed, instead of coming up with
reasons why a plan might fail. According to Klein, a typical pre-mortem session begins after a
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certain plan is developed. Then, a leader informs the team in charge of developing the plan that
the plan has failed. As a result, the team has to identify reasons as to why the plan failed by
imagining plausible problems with the developed plan. The purpose of this exercise is two-fold:
First, the exercise allows individuals to understand that no matter how great a plan may be, it
could still potentially fail. As a result, the exercise forces individuals to revise the plan by
identifying areas that were initially weak and find new solutions to strengthen the overall plan.
At the same time, the exercise keeps individuals from anchoring to one plan, which would make
it difficult to see past future potential problems. Second, by imagining different plausible failure
scenarios, the individual begins to build alternative solutions towards future problems. As such,
the individuals can prepare to act effectively if such problems become real since they have
already a stored representation of such an instance in memory.
Although one can learn the action sequence to develop a specific script, this sequence
may be affected by the changing dynamics and varying complexities of unexpected situations in
the environment. Given the impact that changes in standard contexts have on cognition
performance (e.g., judgment, decision-making, and action-plan development), practicing premortem exercises could foster preparedness. In turn, performance would improve as the
individual would have the ability to select an appropriate response by efficiently switching
between scripts. In comparison to merely knowing one or two scripts about a specific situation,
cognitive flexibility training allows one to imagine a number of different scenarios that may
impact that task, evaluate assumptions, check assumptions against the situation, imagine a
response to such scenarios, and review the effectiveness of the developed solutions. In turn, this
rehearsal should facilitate script flexibility and improve decision-making.
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Two factors are reasoned to be instrumental when understanding the relationship between
cognitive flexibility and performance. First, individual differences in cognitive flexibility can
influence who could be more flexible in switching between scripts in dynamic situations.
Individuals high in cognitive flexibility as evaluated by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, for
example, can be predicted to perform better than individuals who are low in cognitive flexibility.
Second, training can also impact cognitive flexibility and performance. Individuals who are
trained to be more cognitively flexible are more likely to perform better at switching between
scripts when a change in the environment occurs. What is not clear is if training can further
improve performance for someone with cognitive flexibility. Alternatively, could training
negatively affect performance? As such, the following hypotheses are put forth:
Hypothesis 2. There will be a significant positive relationship between cognitive
flexibility and performance. Specifically, cognitive flexibility will help participants correctly
switch between scripts based on changes in the environment.
Hypothesis 3. Individuals high in cognitive flexibility, as measured by the WCST, will
obtain better performance outcomes than individuals low in cognitive flexibility.
Hypothesis 4. Flexibility training will improve cognitive flexibility and yield better
performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 5. Flexibility training will moderate the relationship between pre-measured
cognitive flexibility and cognitive flexibility. Specifically, flexibility training will not negatively
affect the performance of individuals who have high cognitive flexibility (as pre-measured by the
WCST).
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Although cognitive flexibility can be beneficial in helping switch between scripts in
situations that require an alternate script, it could be detrimental when a switch is not required.
That is, when environmental changes are irrelevant, maintaining a standard script (instead of
switching to an alternate) is the best solution (Sternberg & Powell, 1983). As such, in situations
where a standard script is required, having cognitive flexibility could interfere with decisionmaking. As such, the following hypothesis is set forth:
Hypothesis 6. There will be an interaction between cognitive flexibility and the
situational requirement (standard script vs. alternate script). Specifically, cognitive flexibility
will facilitate performance on test items that require a switch to an alternate script than test
items that require a standard script (no script switch required).
The quantity of learned scripts can also influence how cognitive flexibility facilitates
performance. In situations where two scripts are learned (i.e., a standard and an alternate), and
the situation calls for a switch to an alternate script, cognitive flexibility is most likely to
facilitate performance. However, if a situation demands the use of a standard script, and two
scripts are mentally available, then cognitive flexibility may interfere with decision-making.
Therefore, having knowledge of a single script with low cognitive flexibility may be best when
the situation requires a standard script. Based on this logic the following hypothesis is put forth:
Hypothesis 7. Depending on the quantity of scripts learned, having cognitive flexibility
will result in better performance outcomes based on situational requirement (standard script
required vs. alternate script required). That is, participants who learn a single script and are low
in cognitive flexibility will perform better on test items that require a standard script in
comparison to participants who learn two scripts and are either high or low in cognitive
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flexibility. Participants who learn two scripts and are high in cognitive flexibility will perform
better on test items that require a switch to an alternate script in comparison to participants who
learn one script and are either high or low in cognitive flexibility.
Chapter Summary
Cognitive flexibility refers to an individual’s ability to revise their way of thinking in
order to adapt to changes in the environment. Typically, if a script has been successful over time,
individuals may have difficulty revising or switching between to another script when a change
occurs. As such, providing cognitive flexibility training that focuses on mentally simulating a
script failing, while also imagining appropriate alternative solutions will facilitate script
adaptation and improve cognitive readiness when a change in context occurs. Figures 2 captures
the relationship between the study’s constructs and the proposed hypotheses, with the intent to
visualize their linkage.
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Figure 2. Relationship between constructs based on the proposed hypotheses.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Participants
The participants for this study were 53 students recruited from the participant pool
provided by the University of Central Florida’s SONA Systems website. The SONA Systems
website uses a pre-screening measure that students have to complete before participating in any
study. For this study, students were screened for age and color deficiency in order that only
participants who were 18 and older and not color deficient (self-reported) would be able to
participate in this study. The students received course credit for their participation.
Of the 53 participants, three were excluded from the analysis because they exhibited
symptoms of simulator sickness (e.g., nausea, dizziness, vertigo). Also, one participant was
excluded because they continued to and began working on another section of the study without
my approval, and another participant was excluded because she did not follow the safety
instructions while driving (sped through the stops signs and red lights).
A power analysis was conducted to determine an adequate sample size based on a
medium effect size (.25) at an alpha level of .05 with a power level of .8 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The estimated sample size was 48 participants, 12 in each study
condition (four total study conditions). The suggested sample size provided by the power
analysis indicated that the final sample size of 48 participants was adequate to reach sufficient
power. Of the 48 participants, 25 were male and 23 were female, with ages ranging from 18 to
32 years-old (Mage = 19.52). All of the participants had driven a car before, and all except one
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participants had a valid driver’s license or permit. This participant claimed given that due to
moving complications, he was in the process of obtaining his license.
Design
In order to test the effectiveness of cognitive flexibility training on decision-making, this
study used a 2 Script Quantity Training (single script vs. two scripts) x 2 Flexibility Training
(absent vs. present) x 2 Situational Requirement (standard script required vs. alternate script
required) mixed-model factorial design. Flexibility training and script quantity training were the
between-subjects independent variables (see Table 1). Situational requirement was the only
within-subjects variable. The dependent variable was accuracy of selected script.
Table 1
Between-subjects independent variables

Script Quantity

Cognitive Flexibility Training
Absent
Present

Single Script

Single Script,
Training Absent

Single Script,
Training Present

Two Scripts

Two Scripts, Training
Absent

Two Scripts, Training
Present
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Apparatus
The study was administered on a L3 Communications driving simulator for the testing
portion of the experiment (Figure 3 and Figure 4).

Figure 3. L3 Communications driving simulator.

Figure 4. L3 Communications driving simulator.
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Experimental Task
The task of driving is a fluid and dynamic process. As one accumulates driving
experience, action scripts are formed, facilitating behavior and decision-making. Given that the
environment plays a large role when executing driving decisions, one must be able to adapt to its
changes. As such, the scripts developed while driving need to be adapted to the changes
triggered by the dynamic driving process. For example, the standard script to fix an overheating
car usually requires one to turn off the car and check the coolant. This script, however, is
dependent on the type of coolant problem (overheating due to loss of coolant vs. overheating due
to high load) and on outside temperature. For example, during high temperatures, the
implementation of the standard script is not the most effective, as simply pulling to the side of
the road while leaving the engine running is the most effective solution. Having a large database
of alternative scripts can help in this type of decision-making, but having the flexibility to adapt
to situations that deviate from a standard solution could improve decision-making.
Materials and Measures
Informed Consent
Participants were greeted at the experiment facility and then given an informed consent
form. This form explained to the participant the purpose of the study, as well as any risks
associated with participating in the study. Participants were told that their participation in the
study was strictly voluntary and that they could decline or withdraw from participation at any
point of the study.
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Pre-Training Measures
Before engaging in their assigned study condition, participants completed several
individual difference measures. The first measure was the demographics data form, which
included questions regarding age, gender, driving experience, and gaming/simulation experience.
Then, participants completed the WCST (Berg, 1948), which assesses an individual’s ability to
adjust to altered rules by sorting cards according to dimensions (see Appendix E). In addition,
before training, the Mental Imagery Questionnaire was administered to assess the participants’
imagery ability (cf. Jentsch, 1997). Given that spatial ability has been found to be highly
correlated with the ability to perform mental simulations to solve problems (Hegarty & Sims,
1994), the Guilford & Zimmerman Spatial Visualization Test (Guilford & Zimmerman, 1948)
was also administered.
Performance Measure (Driving Scenarios)
The performance measure was composed of a set of 13 driving scenarios involving an
overheating car. These scenarios varied in situational requirement (the requirement of a standard
script or an alternate script). The situational requirement in each scenario prompted participants
to select the correct script based on the visually perceived environmental conditions. Before
these 13 scenarios, participants completed two practice sessions in order to help them become
more familiar with the car simulator (e.g., steering wheel, brakes, speed, etc.). After the
completion of these practice sessions, participants were presented with eight trials of car
overheating scenarios that required a standard script with the intent to build a consistent, strong,
and successful script. The next scenarios involved overheating scenarios that required a standard
script and an alternate script (change in environment that requires an alternate set of actions).
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Specifically, Scenarios 9 and 11 required the implementation of the alternate script, while
Scenarios 10 and 12 required the implementation of a standard script. A last scenario was
presented which involved a unique situation that required a different type of script not learned in
the script tutorials (i.e., neither the standard nor the alternate script). After Scenarios 6 and 13,
participants completed the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, &
Lilienthal, 1993, see Appendix L) in order to assess if participants had symptoms of simulator
sickness (e.g., nausea, vertigo, dizziness, etc.).
Participants were videotaped to record their actions during the simulation (e.g., turning
off A/C, moving to the side of the road, parking, and turning off the engine, etc.). For each
scenario, the engine overheat was triggered at different locations to avoid expectancy and the
ability to predict at which point the engine overheat would occur (see Appendix K). However,
every participant completed the same scenarios, in the same order. In addition, if the participant
did not realize that the engine had overheated (based on the engine temperature increase), an
auditory alert would be triggered. If this alert was ignored, the engine would consequently fail,
and the scenario would come to an end. Pre-established auditory directions guided participants as
they drove around in the simulation. Next, the overheating car scenario is discussed in more
detail.
Responding to an Overheating Car
The script to effectively respond to an overheating car is first determined by the type of
coolant problem (overheating due to loss of coolant vs. overheating due to high load) and by
ambient temperature. When a car is overheating, the temperature gauge will increase towards the
“hot area,” and steam may be seen emerging from the hood (see Figure 5). In instances in which
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the car is traveling with low load during low ambient temperature conditions, the failure is likely
a loss of coolant, a blockage of the coolant lines, or a failure of the coolant pump. Since most
people travel with low load during normal ambient temperature conditions, these instances are
the most typical to occur. As such, these instances require the standard script which involves the
following action steps: (a) turning off the A/C, (b) pulling over to the side of the road and
parking, and (c) turning off the engine. In instances in which the car is traveling in high ambient
temperature conditions, while also exerting more energy due to high load, but not involving any
of the failures above, the alternative script is required. Since these instances do not occur often,
these instances therefore require an alternate script. The alternate script involves the following:
(a) turning off the A/C, (b) pulling over to the side of the road and parking, and (c) keep the
engine running (to circulate coolant through the system as one waits for the car to cool down).

Figure 5. Example of normal vs. high engine temperature.
Post-Testing Measures
After completion of the performance measure, a training reactions questionnaire was
administered (adapted from Jentsch, 1997). Specifically, the training reactions questionnaire was
composed of 10 items to which participants indicated their level of agreement on a 6-point Likert
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scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) about the efficacy of the completed mental
simulation training (see Appendix D). In addition, participants completed a self-efficacy
questionnaire adapted from Kochan (2005). Specifically, this self-efficacy questionnaire was
composed of 10 items to which the participants indicated their level of agreement on a 7-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) about how well they perceived they
performed on the performance task (see Appendix M).
Study Conditions
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four study conditions, in a 2 (number of
scripts) x 2 (training present or absent) design: (a) single script, (b) single script and cognitive
flexibility training, (c) two scripts, and (d) two scripts and cognitive flexibility training.
Single Script
Participants assigned to the “single script” condition were trained on only the standard
script on how to respond to an overheating car (see Appendix F). Specifically, participants
completed a self-paced tutorial presentation in which they learned the following standard script:
(a) turning off the A/C, (b) pulling over to the side of the road, and (c) turning off the engine.
Single Script and Cognitive Flexibility
Participants assigned to the “single script and cognitive flexibility training” condition
were exposed to learning the standard script. As such, participants completed a self-paced
tutorial presentation in which they learned the following standard script: (a) turning off the A/C,
(b) pulling over to the side of the road, and (c) turning off the engine. In addition, participants
engaged in a mental simulation technique which required them to imagine a situation in which
they enter different types of restaurants (see Appendix H). A restaurant setting was chosen due
32

the relative ease with which participants would be able to remember the action steps to make
effective decisions, and also because it was unrelated to driving.
For the cognitive flexibility training, participants were asked to imagine how they would
respond if they entered what appeared from the outside architecture to be a high-end, “5-star”
restaurant, but inside, this restaurant appeared to have mixed characteristics of both a high-end
and a fast food restaurant. In this case, implementing the “5-star” restaurant script is ineffective,
and, therefore, participants should adapt to the new environment by evaluating their assumptions
and checking those assumptions against the current environment. Participants were briefed about
the availability and description of certain items (e.g., menus, sit-down tables, cash registers,
waiting area, etc.) and people (e.g., host, server, cooks, etc.). With this information, participants
were given five minutes to determine a course of action. After the five minutes, participants were
asked about their assumptions and decisions in the task with the following questions:
•

Why did you respond in that way?

•

What were your assumptions about the situation?

•

What is your biggest concern about your plan of action?

•

What items from the briefing were important to you and why?

•

What would you have done differently if other stimuli was present or not present?
Two Scripts
Participants assigned to the “two scripts” condition received instruction on both the

standard script (as described in the single script condition) and an alternate script (i.e., how to
respond to an overheat occurring because of high load) - see Appendix G. Specifically,
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participants learned the following alternate script: (a) turning off the A/C, (b) pulling over to the
side of the road, (c) keep the engine running (as one waits while the car cools down).
Two Scripts and Cognitive Flexibility
Participants assigned to the “two scripts and cognitive flexibility training” condition
received instruction on both the standard script and alternate script on how to respond to an
overheating car, as detailed in the other conditions. After learning the scripts, participants
engaged in the same mental simulation scenario as participants in the “single script and cognitive
flexibility” condition.
Declarative Knowledge Test
After completing their assigned conditions, participants completed a declarative
knowledge test with the intent to measure if the participants acquired the information presented
during the script tutorial sessions (see Appendix I and J).
Procedure
After arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (a) single
script, (b) single script and cognitive flexibility training, (c) two scripts, and (d) two scripts and
cognitive flexibility training. Participants then read the informed consent and completed the
demographics questionnaire and pre-training measure tests of cognitive flexibility, spatial ability,
and mental imagery. Then, participants completed their assigned training conditions. After
training, participants completed the declarative knowledge test, and began the performance
measure (driving scenario). The performance measure consisted of a set of 13 driving scenarios
(eight standard script scenarios, and four scenarios consisting of standard and alternate script
scenarios). A last trial was presented which involved a unique scenario that required a different
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type of script (neither the standard nor the alternate script). Last, participants completed the posttesting measures, before being debriefed and dismissed. Figure 6 summarizes the study’s
progress and procedure.

Random Assignment
Informed Consent

Pre-Training Measures (cognitive
flexibility, spatial ability, mental imagery)

Study Conditions

Single Script

Two Scripts

Single Script
+
Cognitive Flexibility
Training

Two Scripts
+
Cognitive Flexibility
Training

Post Training-Measures

Performance Measure

Debriefing

Figure 6. Study progress and procedure.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS version 23 with an alpha level of .05
unless otherwise noted.
Demographic Variables
Table 2 provides means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for the demographic
variables in this study. The significant correlations indicated that the males in the study were
older, had higher spatial ability, had more auto knowledge (average of knowledge of car parts
inside the hood, knowledge about the coolant system, and knowledge of auto body parts), and
enjoyed performing car maintenance (average of enjoying performing car maintenance, enjoying
performing repairs, and enjoying outfitting cars) more than females. In addition, older
participants had more driving experience, specifically in urban and rural terrains.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among study variables
Variable

M

SD

1

19.52

2.63

–

2. Gender

.52

.50

-.34*

–

3. GPA

3.05

1.26

.17

.17

–

4. Spatial
visualization

13.68

8.88

.28

-.48**

.04

–

5. Driving
experience

2.74

.79

.67**

-.12

.09

.24

–

6. Experience
urban terrain

6.12

1.16

.38**

-.18

.08

.03

.55**

–

7. Experience
rural terrain

5.54

1.24

.37**

-.25

-.00

.27

.43**

.16

–

8. Experience
on hills

3.58

1.93

.20

-.12

-.11

.23

.23

-.19

.44**

–

9. Auto
knowledge

3.59

1.65

.15

-.44**

-.09

.28

.12

.04

.32*

.20

–

10. Familiarity
with car
simulators

3.93

1.89

.20

-.28

-.28

.09

.16

.17

.26

.24

.44**

–

11. Enjoy car
maintenance

2.60

1.70

.22

-.46**

.04

.40*

.15

-.06

.30*

.25

.69**

.46**

1. Age

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

–

12. WCST
3.67
1.14
-.02
-.01
.18
-.07
-.22
.03
-.05
-.13
-.15
-.12
-.19
–
Note. Gender was coded as 0 = male, and 1 = female. Driving experience was coded as 1 = 0-6 months, 2 = 1-2 years, 3 = 3-4 years, and 4 = 5+
years. Terrain experience, knowledge of auto parts, familiarity with car simulators, and car maintenance enjoyment were Likert-scales in
which, 1= not familiar, 7= very familiar. *p < .05 ** p < .01

Check of Random Assignment
To verify that the sample was randomly assigned among the study conditions (i.e., single
script, two scripts, single script and cognitive flexibility training, two scripts and cognitive
flexibility training) based on demographic differences, a series of one-way analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were conducted. Table 3 lists the mean results for these analyses which did not reach
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statistical significance. To assess if there was an association between gender and the study
conditions, and gender and cognitive flexibility (low vs. high pre-task measure), two Chi-Square
(χ2) tests were conducted. Both tests were not significant, p > .05 (see Table 4 for distribution of
gender within the study conditions and high vs. low cognitive flexibility). In addition, a ChiSquare (χ2) test was conducted to assess if there was an association between the study conditions
and cognitive flexibility (low vs. high pre-task measure). This test was not significant, p > .05
(see Table 5 for distribution of pre-task measure of cognitive flexibility within the study
conditions).
Table 3
Group means and standard deviations for the demographics variables based on study conditions

Age

19.52 (2.63)

20.25 (4.25)

19.58 (2.15)

Single Script
and Cog Flex
Training
M (SD)
19.25 (1.71)

Gender

1.48 (.50)

1.67 (.49)

1.42 (.51)

1.42 (.51)

1.42 (.51)

3,47

.72

.54

GPA

3.0 (1.26)

3.2 (1.11)

3.1 (1.08)

3.1 (1.57)

2.8 (1.37)

3,44

.25

.86

Spatial
Visualization

13.68 (8.88)

8.29 (8.24)

17.13 (7.31)

15.67 (8.61)

13.63 (9.61)

3,47

2.49

.07

Driving
Experience

2.74 (.79)

2.75 (.87)

2.72 (.79)

2.75 (.87)

2.75 (.75)

3,46

.002

≈1.0

Experience
urban terrain

6.13 (1.16)

6.0 (1.28)

6.41 (.79)

6.0 (1.35)

6.08 (1.24)

3,47

.34

.80

Experience rural
terrain

5.54 (1.24)

5.08 (1.24)

5.42 (1.38)

5.67 (1.23)

6.0 (1.04)

3,47

1.20

.32

Experience on
hills

3.58 (1.93)

3.33 (1.97)

3.83 (2.08)

3.83 (2.04)

3.33 (1.83)

3,47

.26

.86

Auto Knowledge

3.59 (1.65)

3.00 (1.38)

4.06 (1.48)

3.75 (1.63)

3.56 (2.07)

3,47

.86

.47

Familiarity with
car simulators

3.94 (1.90)

3.5 (2.06)

4.0 (1.76)

4.08 (1.98)

4.17 (1.95)

3,47

.29

.84

Enjoy car
maintenance

2.58 (1.70)

2.00 (1.15)

2.89 (1.99)

2.75 (1.86)

2.69 (1.75)

3,47

.64

.59

WCST

3.67 (1.14)

3.33 (1.37)

2.92 (1.35)

2.50 (.97)

3.0 (.79)

3,47

.72

.55

Variable

Overall
M (SD)

Single Script
M (SD)

Two Scripts
M (SD)
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Two Scripts
and Cog Flex
Training
M (SD)
19.0 (1.71)

3,47

.49

.69

df

F

p

Table 4
Sample size by gender, condition, and pre-task measure of cognitive flexibility

Overall

Single
Script

Two
Scripts

Single Script
and Cognitive
Flexibility
Training

Two Scripts
and Cognitive
Flexibility
Training

Low
Cognitive
Flexibility

High
Cognitive
Flexibility

Male

25

4

7

7

7

9

16

Female

23

8

5

5

5

10

13

Total

48

12

12

12

12

19

29

Gender

Table 5
Sample size by condition and pre-task measure of cognitive flexibility
Pre-task
measure of
Cognitive
Flexibility

Overall

Single
Script

Two
Scripts

Single Script
and Cognitive
Flexibility
Training

Two Scripts
and Cognitive
Flexibility
Training

Low

19

6

3

5

5

High

29

6

9

7

7

Total

48

12

12

12

12

Manipulation Check
This study included one manipulation check to ensure that participants understood the
instructions in the scripts tutorial. For the script tutorial, it was important that participants learned
the required action steps necessary to respond to an overheating engine, depending on the
quantity of scripts learned. To determine if participants learned how to respond to an overheating
engine, they completed a declarative knowledge test that was specific to the quantity of scripts
learned (i.e., either one script or two scripts, see Appendix I and J). The acceptable overall score
criteria was set at 60% (i.e., 3 out of 5 items correctly) for the single script group, while for the
two scripts group the acceptable overall score criteria was set at 71% (i.e., 5 out of 7 items
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correctly). In addition, if participants incorrectly answered the question regarding the correct
action step that should be implemented when an engine overheats occurs; they were to be
excluded from further analysis. The descriptive statistics indicated that all of the participants
scored higher than the minimum set criteria for overall scores in the declarative knowledge test.
Also, given their assigned group, all the participants correctly answered the test item regarding
the action script that should be implemented when an engine overheats occurs. The results of this
manipulation check indicated that participants understood and learned the information presented
in their assigned script tutorial session.
Accuracy of Selected Script Coding
Before analysis, the engine overheat scenarios were coded in order to determine how well
participants responded to the overheat scenarios. Given that the main difference between the two
learned types of scripts was the last action step (i.e., turning off the engine or leaving the engine
running), the scenarios were coded using a binary approach (1 = correct script selected or 0 =
incorrect script selected). That is, if the scenario required for the engine to be turned off and the
participant turned off the engine, then the response was coded as a 1. Similarly, if the scenario
required for the engine to be left running and the participant left the engine running, then the
response was coded as a 1.
Interrater Reliability
Accuracy in the performance measure was examined by two raters based on the binary
coding. To determine consistency between raters, an interrater reliability analysis was conducted
using Cohen’s kappa. The kappa coefficient achieved a value of 1.0, indicating perfect
agreement between the two raters.
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Descriptive Statistics on Overall Accuracy Performance
Before exploring if the study’s hypotheses were supported, I decided to assess overall
accuracy performance on each test scenario in an attempt to find trends and have a better
conceptual understanding of what the test scenario data depicted. Figures 7-10 shows the
descriptive statistics for accuracy on each scenario based on grouping by script quantity,
grouping by cognitive flexibility training, and grouping by study condition. From a high level
approach, the figures below illustrate that Scenario 2, Scenario 7, Scenario 9, and Scenario 11
seemed to be influencing the participants’ decision-making. Specifically, Figure 8 shows that for
Scenario 2 and Scenario 7, possessing two scripts might have been inducing incorrect responses,
whereas Scenario 9 and Scenario 11 show that only possessing one script might be influencing
incorrect responses. Similarly, Figure 10 shows the same trends on Scenario 2, 7, 9, and 11,
between the study conditions. Furthermore, Figure 10 shows that cognitive flexibility training
may have interfered with decision-making, and influenced incorrect responses when possessing
two scripts.

Figure 7. Overall performance on each scenario.
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Figure 8. Performance grouped by script quantity on each scenario.

Figure 9. Performance grouped by cognitive flexibility training on each scenario.
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Figure 10. Performance grouped by study condition on each scenario.
The fact that participants with two scripts seemed to have poor performance on Scenarios
2 and 7 (scenarios that require a standard script) may be due to the fact that, in these scenarios,
the engine failure occurred after travelling uphill. These two specific scenarios had participants
travel uphill to avoid that Scenario 9 (alternate script required) would be the first time that
participants encountered rural/hill terrain. The presences of the hill may have created ambiguity
and negatively influence decision-making. Based on the results of this descriptive analyses, I
chose to further explore performance differences between the ambiguous scenarios (Scenario 2
and Scenario 7), the “switch to alternate” scenarios (Scenarios 8 to 9, Scenarios 10 to 11), and
“switch back” scenarios (Scenarios 9 to 10, and Scenarios 11 to 12).
Ambiguous Standard Scenarios
Two of the standard scenarios (Scenarios 2 and 7) required participants to travel uphill,
although the engine overheat did not happen while on the hill or in high temperature. Given that
these two scenarios were ambiguous, they might have interfered with the decision-making of the
participants with two scripts. As a result, I decided to conduct a series of one-way ANOVAs to
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explore performance differences between the study conditions on Scenarios 1, 2, 6, 7. Results of
the series of one-way ANOVAs indicated that there were significant differences between the
study conditions on performance for Scenario 2, F(3, 47) = 3.35, p = .03, and for Scenario 7,
F(3, 47) = 7.33, p < .001 (see Table 6). There were no significant differences found between the
study conditions on performance for Scenarios 1 and 6, p > .05.
Table 6
One-way ANOVAs for study conditions and accuracy performance on Scenarios 1, 2, 6, and 7
Scenario
Type
Scenario 1
(Standard
Script)

Scenario 2
(Standard
Scriptambiguous)

Scenario 6
(Standard
Script)

Scenario 7
(Standard
Scriptambiguous)

Condition
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog Flex
Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog Flex
Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog Flex
Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog Flex
Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training

Mean
(SD)
1.00 (.00)
.92 (.29)
.92 (.29)

F

Sig. (P-value)

Pairwise comparisons (LSD)

.67

.58

n.s.

3.35

.03

(a) Single Script vs. Two Scripts
and Cog Flex Training*
(b) Single Script and Cog Flex
Training vs. Two scripts*
(c) Single Script and Cog Flex
Training vs. Two scripts and
Cog Flex Training*

1.30

.29

n.s

<.001

(a) Single Script vs. Two Scripts*
(b) Single Script vs. Two Scripts
and Cog Flex Training*
(c) Single Script and Cog Flex
Training vs. Two Scripts*
(d) Single Script and Cog Flex
Training vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*

1.00 (.00)
.75 (.45)
.42 (.51)
.83 (.39)
.33 (.49)

1.00 (.00)
.92 (.29)
1.00 (.00)
.83 (.39)
1.00 (.00)
.52 (.15)
1.00 (.00)

7.33
.50 (.52)

Note. Pairwise comparisons* p < .05

To better understand if there were significant differences between the study conditions,
the standard scenarios, and the ambiguous standard scenarios, I conducted a series of mixed
model ANOVAs for the following scenario pairs: (a) Scenario 1 (standard script required) vs.
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Scenario 2 (standard script required- ambiguous scenario), and (b) Scenario 6 (standard script
required) vs. Scenario 7 (standard script required- ambiguous scenario).
Scenario 1 vs. Scenario 2
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 standard scenarios (Scenario 1 vs.
Scenario 2) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an interaction
between the study conditions and the first two standard scenarios. A significant interaction was
found between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 3.27, p = .03, η2 = .18 (see Figure 11).
Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the means
(LSD pairwise comparison). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 2 (ambiguous standard
script scenario), participants in the single-script condition (M = .75, SD = .45) performed better
than participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .33, SD =
.49). Also for Scenario 2, participants in the single script and cognitive flexibility training
condition (M = .83, SD = .39) performed better than participants in the two scripts condition (M
= .42, SD = .51) and the two scripts and cognitive flexibility condition (M = .33, SD = .49).
Participants in the two scripts condition performed better on Scenario 1 (M = .92, SD = .29) than
on Scenario 2 (M = .42, SD = .51). Likewise, participants in the two scripts and cognitive
flexibility training condition performed better on Scenario 1 (M = 1.00, SD = .00), than on
Scenario 2 (M = .33, SD = .49).
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Figure 11. Accuracy from Standard SCN 1 to Standard SCN 2 (ambiguous).
Scenario 6 vs. Scenario 7
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 standard scenarios (Scenario 6 vs.
Scenario 7) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an interaction
between the study conditions and Scenario 6 and Scenario 7. A significant interaction was found
between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 4.54, p = .01, η2 = .24 (see Figure 12). Followup tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the means (LSD
pairwise comparisons). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 7 (ambiguous standard script
scenario), participants in the single script condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00) performed better than
participants in the two scripts condition (M = .50, SD = .52) and two scripts and cognitive
flexibility training condition (M = .50, SD = .52). Also for Scenario 7, participants in the single
script and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00) performed better than
participants in the two scripts condition (M = .50, SD = .52), and the two scripts and cognitive
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flexibility condition (M = .50, SD = .52). Participants in the two scripts condition performed
better on Scenario 6 (M = .92, SD = .29) than on Scenario 7 (M = .50, SD = .52). Likewise,
participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition performed better on
Scenario 6 (M = .83, SD = .39) than on Scenario 7 (M = .50, SD = .52).

Figure 12. Accuracy from Standard SCN 6 to Standard SCN 7 (ambiguous).
Switch to Alternate and Switch Back Scenarios
“Switch to alternate” scenarios included those scenarios in which a switch from a
standard script to an alternate script was needed, while “switch back” scenarios included those
scenarios in which a switch from the alternate script to the standard script was needed. “Switch
to alternate” included Scenario 8 to Scenario 9, and Scenario 10 to Scenario 11. “Switch back
scenarios” included Scenario 9 to Scenario 10, and Scenario 11 to Scenario 12. First, I conducted
a series of one-way ANOVAs that explore performance differences between the study conditions
on Scenarios 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Results of the series of one-way ANOVAs indicated that there
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were significant differences between the study conditions on performance for Scenario 9, F(3,
47) = 29.97, p < .001, for Scenario 10, F(3, 47) = 3.11, p = .04, and for Scenario 11, F(3, 47) =
36.67, p < .001 (see Table 7). There were no significant differences between the study conditions
on performance for Scenarios 8 and 12, p > .05.
Table 7
One-way ANOVAs for study conditions and accuracy performance on Scenarios 9, 10, 11, and
12
Scenario #

Condition

Scenario 8
(Standard
Script)

Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog
Flex Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog
Flex Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training

Scenario 9
(Alternate
Script)

Scenario 10
(Standard
Script)

Scenario 11
(Alternate
Script)

Scenario 12
(Standard
Script)

Mean
(SD)
1.00 (.00)
1.00 (.00)
1.00 (.00)

F

Sig. (Pvalue)

Pairwise Comparisons

1.00

.40

n.s.

.92 (.29)
.00 (.00)
1.00 (.00)
.08 (.29)
.58 (.51)

Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog
Flex Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training
Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog
Flex Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training

.92 (.29)
1.00 (.00)
.83 (.39)

Single Script
Two Scripts
Single Script and Cog
Flex Training
Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training

1.00 (.00)
1.00 (.00)
1.00 (.00)

29.97

<.001

3.11

.04

(a) Single Script vs. Two Scripts*
(b) Single Script vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*
(c) Single Script and Cog Flex Training
vs. Two Scripts*
(d) Two Scripts vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*
(e) Single Script and Cog Flex Training
vs. Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training*
(a) Single Scripts vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*
(b) Two Scripts vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*

.58 (.51)
.00 (.00)
.83 (.39)
.00 (.00)
.83 (.39)

36.67

<.001

(a) Single Script vs. Two Scripts*
(b) Single Script vs. Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training*
(c) Single Script and Cog Flex Training
vs. Two Scripts*
(d) Single Script and Cog Flex Training
vs. Two Scripts and Cog Flex
Training*

2.20

.10

n.s.

.83 (.39)

Note. Pairwise comparisons* p < .05
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To better understand if there were significant differences between the study conditions,
the “switch to alternate” scenarios, and the “switch back” scenarios, I conducted a series of
mixed model ANOVAs for the following scenario pairs: Scenario 8 (standard script required) vs.
Scenario 9 (alternate script required), Scenario 9 (alternate script required) vs. Scenario 10
(standard script required-switch back), Scenario 10 (standard script required) vs. Scenario 11
(alternate script required), and Scenario 11 (alternate script required) vs. Scenario 12 (standard
script required-switch back).
Scenario 8 vs. Scenario 9 (Switch to Alternate)
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 standard and alternate scenarios
(Scenario 8 vs. Scenario 9) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was
an interaction between the study conditions and Scenarios 8 and 9. A significant interaction was
found between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 33.68, p < .001, η2 = .70 (see Figure 13).
Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the means
(LSD pairwise comparison). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 9 (switch to an alternate
script required), participants in the two scripts condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00) and two scripts
and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .58, SD = .51) performed better than participants
in the single script condition (M = .00, SD = .00) and single script and cognitive flexibility
condition (M = .08, SD = .29). Also, for Scenario 9, participants in the two scripts condition (M =
1.0, SD = .00) performed better than participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility
training condition (M = .58, SD = .51). In addition, participants in the single script condition
performed better on Scenario 8 (M = 1.00, SD = .00) than on Scenario 9 (M = .00, SD = .00).
Participants in the single script and cognitive flexibility training condition performed better on
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Scenario 8 (M = 1.00, SD = .00) than on Scenario 9 (M = .083, SD = .29). Participants in the two
scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition performed better on Scenario 8 (M = .92, SD =
.29) than on Scenario 9 (M = .58, SD = .51).

Figure 13. Accuracy on “switch to alternate” scenarios (from standard SCN 8 to alternate SCN
9).

Scenario 9 vs. Scenario 10 (Switch Back)
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 switch back scenarios (Scenario 9
vs. Scenario 10) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an
interaction between the study conditions and Scenarios 9 and 10. A significant interaction was
found between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 17.40, p < .001, η2 = .54 (see Figure 14).
Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the means
(LSD pairwise comparison). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 9 (alternate script
required), participants in the two scripts condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00) and two scripts and
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cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .58, SD = .51) performed better than participants in
the single script condition (M = .00, SD = .00) and single script and cognitive flexibility
condition (M = .08, SD = .29). Also, for Scenario 9, participants in the two scripts condition (M =
1.0, SD = .00) performed better than participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility
training condition (M = .58, SD = .51). For Scenario 10, participants in the single script condition
(M = .92, SD = .29), two scripts condition (M = 1.0, SD = .00), and single script and cognitive
flexibility training condition (M = .83, SD = .39) performed better than participants in the two
scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .58, SD = .51). Participants in the single
script condition performed better on Scenario 10 (M = .92, SD = .29) than on Scenario 9 (M =
.00, SD = .00). Participants in the single script and cognitive flexibility training condition
performed better on Scenario 10 (M = .83, SD = .39) than on Scenario 9 (M = .083, SD = .29).

Figure 14. Accuracy on “switch back” scenarios (from alternate SCN 9 to standard SCN 10).
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Scenario 10 vs. Scenario 11 (Switch to Alternate)
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 standard and alternate scenarios
(Scenario 10 vs. Scenario 11) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there
was an interaction between the study conditions and Scenarios 10 and 11. A significant
interaction was found between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 19.27, p < .001, η2 = .57
(see Figure 15). Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences
among the means (LSD pairwise comparison). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 10
(standard script required), participants in the single script condition (M = .92, SD = .29), two
scripts condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00), and single script and cognitive flexibility training
condition (M = .83, SD = .39) performed better than participants in two scripts and cognitive
flexibility training condition (M = .58, SD = .51). For Scenario 11, participants in the two scripts
condition (M = .83, SD = .39) and two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition (M =
.83, SD = .39) performed better than participants in the single script condition (M = .00, SD =
.00) and single script and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .00, SD = .00). Participants
in the single script condition performed better on Scenario 10 (M = .92, SD = .29) than on
Scenario 11 (M = .00, SD = .00). Participants in the single script and cognitive flexibility training
condition performed better on Scenario 10 (M = .83, SD = .39) than on Scenario 11 (M = .00, SD
= .00).
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Figure 15. Accuracy on “switch to alternate” scenarios (from standard SCN 10 to alternate SCN
11).

Scenario 11 vs. Scenario 12 (Switch Back)
A 4 Condition (single script vs. two scripts vs. single script and cognitive flexibility
training vs. two scripts and cognitive flexibility training) X 2 switch back scenarios (Scenario 11
vs. Scenario 12) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an
interaction between the study conditions and Scenarios 11 and 12. A significant interaction was
found between condition and scenario type, F(3, 44) = 41.00, p < .001, η2 = .74 (see Figure 16).
Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the means
(LSD pairwise comparison). Follow-up tests indicated that for Scenario 11 (switch to an alternate
script required), participants in the two scripts condition (M = .83, SD = .39) and two scripts and
cognitive flexibility training condition (M = .83, SD = .39) performed better than participants in
the single script condition (M = .00, SD = .00) and single script and cognitive flexibility
condition (M = .00, SD = .00). For Scenario 12 (switch back to the standard script required),
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participants in the single script condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00), two scripts condition (M = 1.00
SD = .00), and single script and cognitive flexibility training condition (M = 1.00, SD = .00)
performed better than participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition
(M = .83, SD = .39). Participants in the single script condition performed better on Scenario 12
(M = 1.00, SD = .00) than on Scenario 11 (M = .00, SD = .00). Participants in the single script
and cognitive flexibility training condition performed better on Scenario 12 (M = 1.00, SD = .00)
than on Scenario 11 (M = .00, SD = .00).

Figure 16. Accuracy on “switch back” scenarios (from alternate SCN 11 to standard SCN 12).
Test of Hypotheses
For these analyses, I focused on analyzing the data by calculating an average
performance score for the standard scenarios (Scenarios 1-8, 10, and 12) and all alternate
scenarios (Scenarios 9 and 11). Also, the pre-task WCST to measure cognitive flexibility was
only administered to collect baseline scores (pre-test), and was not administered as a post-test to
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assess if cognitive flexibility training improved or negatively affected WCST performance
scores. As a result, Hypotheses 2 to 7 were not analyzed as proposed. Instead, these hypotheses
were analyzed using a 2 cognitive flexibility (low vs. high pre-task measure groups) by 2
cognitive flexibility training (absent vs. present) design: (a) low cognitive flexibility, training
absent, (b) high cognitive flexibility, training present, (c) low cognitive flexibility, training
absent, and (d) high cognitive flexibility, training present. To assess if there was an association
between gender and these cognitive flexibility groups, a Chi-Square (χ2) test was conducted. The
test was not significant, p > .05 (see Table 8 for distribution of gender within the new cognitive
flexibility groups).
Table 8
Sample size by gender and cognitive flexibility
Overall

Low Flex,
Training Absent

High Flex,
Training Absent

Low Flex,
Training Present

High Flex, Training
Present

Male

25

2

9

7

7

Female

23

7

6

3

7

Total

48

9

15

10

14

Gender

Hypothesis 1 Analysis
There will be an interaction between script quantity and situational requirement
(standard script vs. alternate script). Specifically, participants who learn two scripts
(standard and alternate) will perform better on test items that require a switch to an
alternate script than participants who learn a single script. In contrast, participants who
learn a single script will perform better on test items that require maintaining a standard
script.
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A 2 (single script vs. two scripts) X 2 (standard script required vs. alternate script
required) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an interaction
between script quantity and situational requirement. A significant interaction was found between
script quantity and the situational requirement, F(1, 46) = 173.68, p < .001, η2 = .79, (see Figure
17). Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate significant pairwise differences among the
means (LSD pairwise comparison). The pairwise comparisons indicated that participants who
learned one script (M = .96, SD = .06) performed better on scenarios that required a standard
script (i.e., turn off the engine), than participants who learned two scripts (M = .81, SD = .19). In
addition, participants who learned two scripts (M = .81, SD = .29) performed better on scenarios
that required an alternate script (i.e., leave the engine running), than participants who only
learned one script (M = .02, SD = .10). Furthermore, participants who only learned one script
performed better on scenarios that required the standard script (M = .96, SD = .06), than
scenarios that required an alternate script (M = .02, SD = .10). The results supported Hypothesis
1, given that possessing two scripts was more beneficial when a switch to an alternate script was
required, while only possessing one script was more beneficial when the standard script was
required.
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Figure 17. Interaction between script quantity and situational requirement.
Hypotheses 2-6 Analysis
As a whole, Hypotheses 2-6 explored the effects of cognitive flexibility on performance on
the test scenarios. Specifically, cognitive flexibility was predicted to facilitate performance on
test items that require a switch to an alternate script than test items that require a standard
script (no script switch required).
A 4 cognitive flexibility (low cognitive flexibility and training absent, high cognitive
flexibility and training absent, low cognitive flexibility and training present, high cognitive
flexibility and training absent) x 2 situational requirement (standard script required vs. alternate
script required) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an
interaction between the pre-task high vs. low cognitive flexibility, cognitive flexibility training,
and situational requirement. There was no significant interaction found, F(3, 44) = .31, p > .05,
η2 = .02 (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Low vs. high cognitive flexibility and cognitive flexibility training by situational
requirement.
The results did not support this hypothesis, as cognitive flexibility did not facilitate
performance on the alternate items in comparison to the standard items.
Hypothesis 7 Analysis
Depending on the quantity of scripts learned, having cognitive flexibility will result in
better performance outcomes based on situational requirement (standard script required
vs. alternate script required). That is, participants who learn a single script and are low
in cognitive flexibility will perform better on test items that require a standard script in
comparison to participants who learn two scripts and are either high or low in cognitive
flexibility. Participants who learn two scripts and are high in cognitive flexibility will
perform better on test items that require a switch to an alternate script in comparison to
participants who learn one script and are either high or low in cognitive flexibility.
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A 2 script quantity (single script vs. two scripts) X 4 cognitive flexibility (low cognitive
flexibility and training absent, high cognitive flexibility and training absent, low cognitive
flexibility and training present, high cognitive flexibility and training absent) X 2 situational
requirement (standard script required vs. alternate script required) repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted to determine if there was a three-way interaction between script quantity,
cognitive flexibility, and situational requirement. A three-way interaction failed to reach
significance, F(3, 40) = .75, p > .05, η2 = .05 (see Figure 19 and 20).

Figure 19. Three-way interaction between cognitive flexibility, script quantity, and standard
script required.
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Figure 20. Three-way interaction between cognitive flexibility, script quantity, and alternate
script required.
Hypothesis 7 was not supported given that the three-way interaction was not significant.
On the standard scenarios, there were no significant differences between participants who
learned a single script and were low in cognitive flexibility and participants who learned two
scripts and were either high or low in cognitive flexibility. However, participants who learned
two scripts and were high in cognitive flexibility performed better on items that required a switch
to an alternate script in comparison to participants who learned one script and were either high or
low in cognitive flexibility.

Scenario 13
The purpose of Scenario 13 was to present participants with a situation that was not part
of their assigned script tutorial session. The goal was to understand how participants would
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behave if something unexpected, untrained, and not learned occurred. In the previous 12
scenarios, if the participant continued to drive after the engine overheated, an auditory alert
would occur, and if this alert was furthered ignored, then the engine would fail. When the
auditory alert occurred on Scenario 13, the engine’s temperature gauge had never increased to
indicate overheating (i.e., the alert signified another unlearned type of problem). As a result, this
change in environment created a situation the participant had not experienced before in the
previous 12 scenarios or learned during their script tutorial session. Scenario 13 was analyzed
independently because script accuracy was not assessed. The inclusion of this last scenario
prompted the following questions:
•

Would participants ignore the alert and continue to drive given that the engine
temperature had not increased?

•

Would participants continue to implement the learned scripts as in the previous
scenarios?

Of the 48 participants, 44 (92%) performed the actions steps learned in their script
tutorial session (i.e., turn off A/C, pullover to the side of the road, park, turn off/leave engine
running). Additionally, 34 participants (71%) turned off the engine, while 14 participants (29%)
left the engine running. To assess if there was a relationship between condition and response
selection (e.g., turning off the engine or leaving the engine running), a Chi-Square (χ2) test was
conducted. The test was significant, χ2 (3, N = 48) = 10.08, p < .05, indicating that there was a
relationship between condition and response selection (see Table 9). Last, 35 participants (73%)
continued to drive until the engine failed. It is worth mentioning that participants seemed to be
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surprised by hearing the alert and not seeing the temperature gauge increase. This prompted
comments such as:
•

“Why is it doing that if it is not overheating?”

•

“It is not overheating”

•

“What was the chime for?”

•

“I am not sure why the alert occurred but I am turning off the engine to be safe”

Table 9
Relationship between condition and response selection for Scenario 13.
Response

Overall

Single Script

Two Scripts

Single Script and
Cog Flex Training

Two Scripts and
Cog Flex Training

Turned off
engine

34

8

9

12

5

Left engine
running

14

4

3

0

7

Total

48

12

12

12

12
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between the theories of
script-processing and cognitive flexibility by (a) evaluating the effectiveness of possessing
alternate scripts to respond to situations, and (b) assessing the effectiveness of cognitive
flexibility training on the ability to switch between scripts. It was expected that learning
additional alternate scripts can influence adaptation to changes in the environment. Additionally,
it was expected that cognitive flexibility training would facilitate the ability to effectively switch
between scripts and as a result, avoid intransigence towards alternate solutions. Overall, the
results suggested that for situations requiring a change or an adaptation to an alternate response,
possessing two scripts facilitated correct decision-making, whereas cognitive flexibility training
may have hindered decision-making.
Ambiguous Scenarios Interpretation
Exploring trends based on performance on each scenario revealed that participants with
two scrips (with or without cognitive flexibility training) performed poorly during two standard
scenarios (Scenario 2 and Scenario 7) in comparison to the rest of the standard scenarios. These
two standard scenarios required participants to travel uphill (in low ambient temperatures), with
the engine overheat occurring after the hill. Since participants with two scripts learned that an
alternate script was required in high ambient temperatures and if the car was travelling uphill or
on an incline (high load), the presence of the hill in those two scenarios created ambiguity and
thus negatively influenced their decision-making.
Although these two scenarios were purposely designed in that manner to prevent that
Scenario 9 (alternate script required) would be the first time participants perceived and travelled
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uphill, they still reveal an interesting aspect about possessing two scripts. That is, if the situation
is ambiguous, and multiple scripts are known, then it is possible that the incorrect script can be
selected. This was supported after comparing accuracy performance between standard Scenario 1
vs. standard Scenario 2, and standard Scenario 6 and standard Scenario 7. The results indicated
that for Scenarios 1 and 6, there were no significant differences between possessing a single
script or two scripts (with or without cognitive flexibility training), but when these standard
scenarios become ambiguous (Scenarios 2 and 7), possessing only the standard script benefits
script selection accuracy, while possessing two scripts could make an individual less accurate in
their script selection.
While these results were not surprising, they further support previous research on script
processing (Gioia & Poole, 1984; Gioia & Manz, 1985), specifically Klein’s RPD model (Klein
et al., 1986). In the RPD model, when a situation is familiar and a matching script is already
stored in memory, the decision is implemented effectively and automatically (Phillips, Klein, &
Sieck, 2004). This type of behavior was elicited by standard Scenarios 1 and 6, which were
situations that could be clearly identified as familiar to individuals in either the single script or
the two script groups. The RPD model also illustrates that not all events are perceived as
familiar, and thus ambiguity in the environment can elicit the need of additional information to
understand the current makeup of the situation (script mismatch). This was the case for standard
Scenarios 2 and 7, as participants with two scripts perceived an environment that was vaguely in
line with what they learned during their script tutorial session (turn off the engine in low ambient
temperatures while the overheat does not occur on an incline, or leave the engine running in high
ambient temperatures while the overheat occurs on an incline). As stated by Leach (2004), when
a solution cannot be formulated and a script cannot be retrieved, humans may experience states
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of confusion or “cognitive freeze”, and this confusion about the makeup of Scenario 2 was likely
the reason as to why participants with two scripts selected the incorrect script.
Switch to Alternate and Switch Back Scenarios Interpretation
Switch to Alternate Interpretation
The results for the “switch to alternate” scenarios (from standard Scenario 8 to alternate
Scenario 9 and from standard Scenario 10 to alternate Scenario 11), indicated that possessing
only one script (standard) was beneficial for standard situations (Scenario 8 and Scenario 10),
but significantly less helpful when a switch to an alternate situation was needed (Scenario 9 and
Scenario 11), regardless of cognitive flexibility training. Meanwhile, possessing two scripts was
beneficial for standard situations (Scenario 8 and Scenario 10), and also beneficial for alternate
situations (Scenario 9 and Scenario 11). However, cognitive flexibility training seemed to hinder
decision-making when responding to alternate situations. That is, possessing only two scripts
was significantly more beneficial when responding to a switch to alternate situation (Scenario 9)
in comparison to having two scripts and cognitive flexibility training. This result indicated that
instead of benefiting the ability to switch from a standard to an alternate script, cognitive
flexibility training seemed to impair the ability to switch between scripts. This same result was
not replicated for Scenario 11, possibly due to the fact that Scenario 11 was the second time the
alternate script was needed, and thus participants could have been more certain about which
script to select.
Recalling the findings from the literature on cognitive flexibility can shed some light
about the results on the “switch to alternate” scenarios. When individuals are exposed to a
constant environment, their script strength increases (they become less cognitive flexible) to the
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degree that their responses are successful over many trials (Betsch et al., 2001; Bröder &
Schiffer, 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). In fact, Cañas et al. (2003), demonstrated that responding to
consecutive trials with constant environmental conditions helped develop a strong successful
strategy, and negatively affected performance when a change in the environment demanded an
adjustment in response. In this case, participants in the Cañas et al. study were expected to have
difficulty in adapting to environmental changes presented in later trials, and show a tendency to
continue to use the same strategy developed in earlier trials. In contrast, possessing a weak
routine, or training in varying environments, benefits correct switching performance when a
change in environment prompts an alternate response.
When I designed the engine overheat trials, I intended for participants to develop a strong
successful script by requiring the standard script on the first eight overheat trials, in order to
assess if participants with two scripts would have difficulty in switching to the alternate script
(show a tendency to continue to use the standard script). However, ambiguous Scenarios 2 and 7
may have countered this effect. That is, the “lulling effect” of the first eight trials was not
present, given participants with two scripts were prone to implement the alternate script on
Scenarios 2 and 7. Nevertheless, the presence of these two ambiguous scenarios help support the
notion that responding within non-constant varying environments benefitted correct switching
performance. The fact that participants with two scripts were not “lulled” and perceived the first
eight trials as a variation of standard and alternate scenarios led them to become more flexible,
and as a result, they had the ability to correctly switch between scripts when an alternate script
was required.
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What was not expected was that cognitive flexibility training would negatively affect
performance on the “switch to alternate” trials for participants with two scripts. Specifically, for
Scenario 9, participants assigned to the two scripts only condition performed significantly better
than participants in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition, indicating that
cognitive flexibility training may have impaired the ability to effectively switch between scripts.
It is possible that cognitive flexibility training may have sparked indecisiveness, as opposed to
not having cognitive flexibility training. One possible explanation may refer back to the
ambiguity of standard Scenarios 2 and 7. As mentioned earlier, the presence of these two
ambiguous scenarios removed the “lulling effect,” and consequently, participants with two
scripts responded to what they perceived to be a variation of standard and alternate scenarios.
Given this, the environment already provided a flexible and changing set of trials which when
combined with cognitive flexibility training led to indecisiveness (influenced participants to
become uncertain about which script to select). This explanation raises the following questions:
•

Is training to respond in varying environments (environments that prompts a consecutive
switch between scripts) better than solely training for cognitive flexibility (as described in
the method section) in order to achieve cognitive flexibility, and improve the ability to
switch effectively between scripts?

•

Is training for cognitive flexibility (as presented in this study’s method section) better
suited when responding to consecutive trials that provoke a lulling effect (trials that
develop a strong successful script)?

67

Switch Back Interpretation
The results for the “switch back” scenarios (from alternate Scenario 9 to standard
Scenario 10 and from alternate Scenario 11 to standard Scenario 12), indicated that possessing
only one script was beneficial for situations in which a switch back to the standard script was
needed (Scenario 10 and Scenario 12), but significantly less helpful in alternate scenarios that
required an alternate script (Scenario 9 and Scenario 11), regardless of cognitive flexibility
training. Possessing two scripts was beneficial for alternate situations (Scenario 9 and Scenario
11), and also for switch back situations (standard Scenario 10 and Scenario 12), whereas
cognitive flexibility training may have hindered decision-making.
Scenario 10 seems to be another example in which cognitive flexibility training
negatively affected the ability to correctly switch between two scripts. In fact, participants with
only two scripts were able to “switch back” to the standard script significantly better than
participants with two scripts and cognitive flexibility training. As is the case with the “switch to
alternate” results, participants with two scripts likely became too indecisive as a result of
cognitive flexibility training. A deeper look at the data revealed that incorrect responses in
Scenario 10 were more due to the fact that the engine failed before these participants made a
decision and not because they had implemented the incorrect script. In fact, after the engine
failed, only one participant in the two scripts and cognitive flexibility training condition
implemented the incorrect script (left the engine running), while five participants correctly
turned off the engine. Regardless, after the overheat occurred, the indecisiveness produced from
cognitive flexibility training likely played a role in having these participants continue to drive as
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they weighed which script to select. As a result of this indecisiveness, these participants were not
able to make a decision in time to produce a positive outcome.
Hypotheses 1 Interpretation
Hypothesis 1 explored the effect of script quantity (single script vs. two scripts) on the
situational requirement (standard script required vs. alternate script required). I predicted that
there would be an interaction between these two variables and that (a) participants who learn a
single script would perform better on test items that require maintaining a standard script, and (b)
participants who learn two scripts (standard and alternate) would perform better on test items that
require a switch to an alternate script than participants who learn a single script (standard script
only). The results supported Hypothesis 1, given that only possessing one script was more
beneficial than possessing two scripts when the standard script was required, and possessing two
scripts was more beneficial when a switch to an alternate script was required. These results were
largely due to the fact that the ambiguous scenarios (standard Scenarios 2 and 7) negatively
affected the accuracy of the participants with two scripts.
Hypothesis 1 results further support the RPD model of decision-making (Klein et al.,
1986). As mentioned in the ambiguous scenarios interpretations section, when a decision-maker
recognizes a situation to be one that was experienced in the past (i.e., scripts already stored in
long-term memory), the event is judged to be familiar, and the decision to implement the correct
script becomes automatic. Participants who only learned the single standard script were able to
recognize the standard scenarios as familiar and therefore had no problem implementing the
learned script. Likewise, participants who learned both the standard and alternate scripts, were
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able to judge both standard and alternate scenarios as familiar (except for the ambiguous
standard scenarios), and thus were able to implement the correct script for both situations.
The RPD model also states that when an environment is unfamiliar or presents itself in a
different context, the situation may not match an experience or script already stored in memory
(i.e., script mismatch). This is the case for participants who only learned the single standard
script and attempted to match the script to the scenarios that required the alternate script.
Undoubtedly, the script was not available, and thus they implemented the only script they had
available. This was also the case for participants who learned two scripts, as these participants
perceived the ambiguous standard scenarios as unfamiliar, and given this script mismatch, they
decided to implement one of the two scripts that closely matched the situation, yielding an
incorrect response.
Hypotheses 2-6 Interpretation
The WCST to measure cognitive flexibility was only administered to collect baseline
scores (pre-test), and was not administered as a post-test to assess if cognitive flexibility training
improved or decreased WCST performance scores. As a result, Hypotheses 2 through Hypothesis
7 were not tested as proposed. In summary, Hypotheses 2 through 7 focused on the effects of
cognitive flexibility on performance. As a whole these hypotheses predicted that cognitive
flexibility would help participants correctly switch between scripts based on the situational
requirement. Specifically, cognitive flexibility was predicted to facilitate performance on test
items that required a switch to an alternate script than test items that required a standard script
(no script switch required).
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In an attempt to test these hypotheses, I merged cognitive flexibility (low vs. high pre-test
groups) with cognitive flexibility training (absent vs. present) in order to at least consider how
the combination of these variables affected performance on the standard and alternate scenarios.
The results indicated that an interaction effect was not significant, as participants in all four
groups did very well on the standard scenarios, and participants in all four groups did poor in the
alternate scenarios. The overall lack of interaction and the poor performance in the alternate
scenarios is very likely due to the participants with a single script, given that they did not possess
the alternate script in memory. Based on this, the interpretation of Hypothesis 7 could shed some
light on the effects of script quantity and these cognitive flexibility groups on performance.
Hypotheses 7 Interpretation
The purpose of Hypothesis 7 was to explore if a three-way interaction would occur
between script quantity, cognitive flexibility, and the situational requirement. Although the
interaction was not significant, there was a specific result that was similar to a previous trend
noticed on the “switch to alternate” analysis described above. Specifically, on the alternate
scenarios, participants who learned two scripts, were high in cognitive flexibility, and were also
trained on cognitive flexibility did worse than participants with two scripts, low in cognitive
flexibility, and not trained in cognitive flexibility. This trend was also present when I analyzed
the “switch to alternate” scenarios, in which participants with two scripts performed better than
participants with two scripts and cognitive flexibility training on alternate Scenario 9. Again,
these results seem to indicate that too much flexibility (being high as well as receive training)
can negatively affect performance by making individuals more indecisive in their responses.
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Scenario 13 Interpretation
The purpose of Scenario 13 was to add a scenario to the end of the test trials that
participants had not learned in their respective scripts tutorial sessions and/or seen during the
testing session (i.e., unexpected scenario). During their assigned script tutorial, participants
learned that if they continued to drive after the engine overheated, an auditory alert would occur,
and if this alert was furthered ignored, then the engine would fail. When the auditory alert
occurred on Scenario 13, the engine’s temperature gauge had never increased to indicate
overheating, resulting in an unexpected situation. This scenario was analyzed independently
because script accuracy was no assessed (there was no correct or incorrect response) as I was
only interested in how participants would behave. The results of performance from this scenario
indicated that even when the engine had not overheated, 92% of the participants attempted to
implement the action steps learned in their script tutorial sessions. In addition, 73% continued to
drive (ignoring the alert) until the engine failed.
What is interesting about this result is that regardless of how many scripts learned,
participants attempted to implement a response, even when the situation did not call for either
script. For Scenario 13, the “lulling effect” seemed to have had an influence on responses.
Specifically, for 12 consecutive scenarios participants had to respond to an overheating engine
problem by implementing one of the two scripts learned. As a result, participants developed a
strong expectation from these 12 test scenarios. When a change in context occurred in Scenario
13, participants continued to implement what they thought was still an adequate response, even
when the unexpected nature of the scenario caused confusion, and even when they acknowledged
that the engine had not overheated. The response to this scenario parallels the results of the
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studies that explored the effects of developing a successful script over a number or trials (Betsch
et al., 2001; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). These results also corroborate the
“Einstellung effect” (Luchins & Luchins, 1959), which centered on the idea that when a strategy
is successful over a number of trials, it is difficult to adapt or change to a more adequate strategy
when a change in environment occurs.
Implications and Conclusion
Implications for Theory – Script Processing
The findings of this research contribute to the existing body of knowledge in scriptprocessing by showing that having at least two scripts is essential for adequate decision-making,
especially on situations that require a switch to an alternate script. Although this study only
investigated the effects of possessing two scripts (a standard and an alternate), the findings
supports the theory that a pre-set “library” of learned experiences benefits effective decisionmaking given that these experiences can be matched to a situation (as suggested by Klein, 1998).
In addition, the findings furthered support the RPD model of decision-making, in that learned
scripts stored in a mental database are helpful when responding to familiar situations. For
example, participants who only learned the standard script, were able to match that script to
standard scenarios, while participants who learned both the standard and alternate scripts were
able to effectively match both scripts to their respective standard and alternate scenarios.
Therefore, when a situation is familiar or has been experienced in the past, matching a script
from the database to the situation becomes automatic and effective. In contrast, to respond to
unfamiliar and/or ambiguous situations, individuals need additional information because they do
not possess a matching script in their mental database that can be used as an effective response.
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For example, participants who learned only the standard script performed poor on scenarios that
required an alternate script because they did not have the correct matching script in their
database, while participants who learned both the standard and alternate script, did not perform
well on ambiguous standard scenarios, prompting them to select the incorrect script from their
mental database.
Implications for Theory – Cognitive Flexibility
Although there is a limited amount of research on cognitive flexibility as a construct,
research has explored human capabilities in adapting to changes in the environment. The
majority of the research discussed in the literature review in this document focused on the
difficulty of switching strategies when a strong strategy has successfully over time (Betsch et al.,
2001; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Luchins & Luchins, 1959; Meyer et al., 1997). In these cases, the
constant nature of the environment indicated that the same successful response should be
implemented, making it difficult to revise a response (become less flexible) when a change
requires a shift in decision. The opposite effect occurs if a strategy is not strong, or if the
environment in which one is responding is changing and varies after responses. This then allows
an individual to become more flexible as they are not developing a strong consistent successful
script.
The current study attempted to replicate a constant environment that presented
participants with eight consecutive scenarios that required the standard script (i.e., to develop a
strong successful script). However, the ambiguity of Scenarios 2 and 7 affected this manipulation
given that participants with two scripts perceived those two scenarios as ones that required the
alternate script. As a result, during the first eight trials they perceived a varying environment of
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standard and alternate scenarios which allowed them to be more flexible and accurate when
responding to the script switching (alternate script) scenarios. Although I could not test how
participants would have responded to an alternate script switch after developing a consistent
standard script response, the results support the notion that individuals can switch between
scripts more effectively (become more flexible) when a strong script is not developed over time.
This notion to become more flexible/inflexible depending on varying environmental
conditions was also supported by the results on Scenario 13. Since in Scenario 13 participants
perceived an environment never seen before in the previous 12 trials, their responses centered in
what they had learned from experience. Responding to the 12 trials based on the scripts learned
created a strong successful expectation of how to respond to these scenarios. When the
environment changed (as presented by Scenario 13), participants had difficulty understanding the
change, and thus continued to respond in the same way as in the 12 trials (by implementing a
standard or alternate script), even when there was a mismatch between required response and
script stored in memory.
The fact that cognitive flexibility training was detrimental to the switching performance
of participants with two scripts may be due to two reasons: First, without considering the effects
of the ambiguous scenarios, cognitive flexibility training may have simply impaired the ability to
effectively switch between scripts by sparking indecisiveness and as a result augmenting
uncertainty. Second, the switching ability may have been affected by the additional effects of
perceiving the first eight scenarios as ones that varied between standard and alternate. As
proposed in the literature, this variation can help one switch to another response when a change
in environment occurs (improving their response flexibility). The addition of cognitive flexibility
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training to these circumstances could have made participants more indecisive and less certain
about which script correctly matched the situation. Regardless of these two reasons, the results
support the notion that training for cognitive flexibility can make someone indecisive when it
comes to switching between scripts.
Implications for Practice – Script Processing
The results of this study have implications on how to develop effective training that helps
responding to unfamiliar, changing situations. Although not surprising, the results of this study
supports the notion that a mental database of scripts facilitates decision-making, as matching a
script to a perceived familiar event becomes easier. Since it is impossible to train for and learn all
the types of situations that can be encountered, training designers should at the very least focus
on collecting every possible piece of information that might affect responses. After this
information is collected, individuals should learn these various pieces of information in order to
begin developing a database of responses that can be used to match a given situation. However,
even after training with every bit of information, a new and/or unexpected event can still occur,
and based on previous research, and the results from Scenario 13, when a script is not available,
an individual seems to struggle to respond effectively by implementing a solution from the script
database that closely matches the current situation.
Implications for Practice – Cognitive Flexibility
One of the goals of this study was to assess if cognitive flexibility could be trained
(through mental simulation), and although I was not able to conclude if cognitive flexibility
training improved or impaired cognitive flexibility, it seemed, however, that cognitive flexibility
training sparked indecisiveness, and as a result impaired performance when a switch to an
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alternate script was needed. Given this, training for cognitive flexibility using mental simulation
as described in this study, should not be the main focus in training design. Perhaps a more taskspecific mental simulation training that would have had participants mentally simulate how they
would respond if their engine overheat script were to fail would be more effective. However, for
this study, that would have primed participants to expect that something may go wrong with their
scripts during the actual test scenarios.
The results of this research demonstrate that cognitive flexibility can be trained, not by
performing mental simulations about unexpected events, but by creating a varying/flexible
environment during training that allows for multiple responses to be learned without creating one
single successive response. For example, if a real-world situation typically calls for a standard
script, and the implementation of an alternate script seldom occurs, it is likely that an individual
could develop a strong bias towards implementing the script they perceive more often (standard
script) even when a change in the environment requires the script that seldom occurs. To combat
this problem, initial and recurrent training should provide training for both scripts with the same
frequency to avoid intransigence towards the less occurring script.
Conclusion
In Chapter 1 of this document, the following research questions were put forth with the
intent to finding an answer based on the results of this study:
(RQ1) Does possessing a repertoire of scripts facilitate adaptation to changes in the
environment if cognitive flexibility training is provided (i.e., if the ability to switch between these
scripts is learned)?
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The results of this study clearly demonstrate that a database of scripts is beneficial on its
own, and that switching ability may be an effect of possessing the correct scripts that match the
situation. Training within an environment that does not allow the development of a single, strong
and successful script is also beneficial to script switching ability.
(RQ2) Is simply owning one script and having an understanding that the script may fail,
or may need to be revised in a different context (through cognitive flexibility training), enough to
avoid overreliance to one standard solution?
Owning one script is not enough to avoid overreliance to one standard solution simply
because when a script does not exist, there is no way to match it to the changing situation. As
shown in this study, when only the standard script was learned, it was implemented as a response
for all situations, even when cognitive flexibility training was provided.
(RQ3) What is the cost of cognitive flexibility? Could switching ability negatively affect
decision-making when a standard script is required (no switch needed)?
Cognitive flexibility training affected responses when a switch was needed (Scenario 9)
and when a switch was not needed (Scenario 10). The results from this study suggested that
cognitive flexibility training can create indecision and uncertainty about which script is best
when one has to switch to and switch back from standard to alternate and from alternate to
standard.
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Limitations and Future Research
Study Limitations
One of the focus areas of this study was to assess the impact of cognitive flexibility on
the ability to effectively switch between scripts. Post-training scores for the WCST (cognitive
flexibility measure) were not collected, and as a result, this limitation did not allow for proper
assessment of the effects of cognitive flexibility on performance. In addition, WCST posttraining scores would have made clear if the cognitive flexibility training improved, or worsened
cognitive flexibility. As a result, the post-training scores would have yielded a better
understanding of why the training produced indecisiveness (either it augmented total flexibility,
or decreased total flexibility).
Another study limitation was the impact that the ambiguous scenarios had on the “lulling
effect.” Although the ambiguous standard scenarios supported the notion that responding to
situations that vary in response requirement facilitates script switching, it did not test for the
effects of responding eight consecutive times with the standard response. It is possible that with
the proper “lulling effect” participants with two scripts would have remained stuck, and thus had
difficulty in switching to an alternate script on Scenario 9 (alternate script required). As a result
of the “lulling effect,” it is possible that cognitive flexibility training could have then facilitated
script switching for participants with two scripts.
Not presenting feedback to participants after each scenario may be another limitation. I
did not elect to give feedback because I had administered the declarative knowledge test which
tested whether participants had the correct information from their assigned script tutorial
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sessions. However, presenting feedback could have facilitated the “lulling effect,” especially for
participants with two scripts. Specifically, if participants would have received negative feedback
when they implemented the alternate script in the ambiguous scenarios, they would have
perceived the first eight scenarios as ones that required the standard script. Given this,
participants could have then find it more difficult to switch to the alternate script in the alternate
scenario, and perhaps cognitive flexibility training would have facilitated script switching.
Additionally, participants with one script could have been surprised to learn that the standard
script was actually incorrect for the alternate scenarios, but due to the unavailability of an
alternate script in their mental database, they would have still implemented the standard script
incorrectly on the second alternate scenario (Scenario 11).
Areas of Future Research
Future research should continue to investigate the effects of scripts and cognitive
flexibility on decision-making. Since individuals rely on the familiarity of situations to
implement scripts, responding to situations that are unfamiliar (i.e., situations in which a script
may not exist) is of concern. As illustrated in these results, participants who only learned one
script, continued to implement the standard script even in situations that called for a
different/alternate type of response. More research should explore how to train/teach individuals
to effectively and efficiently respond to situations that are unfamiliar or uncommon. Since in
complex and dynamic worlds it is impossible to train and learn all situations that can occur, then
individuals should train to not find the best/perfect response. Instead, when a situation cannot be
matched to a script, individuals should be prepared to be flexible enough to find an adequate
solution that can lead to achieving the least possible damage. For instance, in aviation, if a pilot
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experienced confusion about how to respond to a certain situation, then he/she should focus on
aviating and leading the aircraft towards safety. If the pilot instead becomes too focused about
finding a solution to the situation that requires an unavailable script, the main goal of aircraft
safety could be in jeopardy.
For situations in which a script is unavailable, training should focus on helping
individuals have and understanding that due to the high complexity of dynamic environments,
some learned scripts will not be able to be matched to specific situations. For this cases, future
research should investigate how a cognitive flexibility training that is more relevant to an actual
situation (as opposed to the generic cognitive flexibility training in this study). This might be
simply leading individuals to understand that although there is a standard way to respond to
some situations, there will be some instances in which that standard response will cease to work.
This will prepare individuals to understand that a script will sometimes fail, and as a result, they
need to learn how to switch to a more adequate solution. Although the correct alternate script
may not be available from the script database, other experiences can be used to mold and
restructure the standard script to find a more adequate albeit not perfect solution.
Script quantity is another aspect that may be in need of more research. For example, the
concept of possessing multiple scripts based on past experiences has also been discussed in the
literature in terms of analogies. Basically, analogies allow individuals to understand a novel
situation by comparing it with a familiar one already stored in memory (Gentner and Holyoak,
1997). In addition, studies have found that individuals can formulate solutions by using
analogous problems from a different domain (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). In the case of this study, a
participant who may have had previous experience working on machines that also uses a cooling
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process similar to that of car’s engine could have used this experience as an analogy in order to
make a decision. Future research should explore differences between using scripts based on
analogous problems and using scripts that exactly match a problem. Also, future research should
address these questions about the effects of possessing more than two scripts on decision-making
performance:
•

What is the effect of having more than two scripts to choose from?

•

Would performance be poorer if more options are available, or would it benefit decisionmaking?

•

What is the effect of script quantity in team dynamics?

•

In a team setting, how would individuals interact if one team member only possesses one
script and another team member possesses two scripts?

•

How would individuals interact if one team member has higher cognitive flexibility than
another team member?
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APPENDIX A: IRB OUTCOME LETTER
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APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT
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APENDIX C. MENTAL IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE
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Mental Imagery Questionnaire
For the following set of questions, “mental imagery” describes the mental rehearsal of tasks,
procedures, conditions, etc. Use of mental imagery can take the form of “chair flying,” “hangar
flying,” imagining the performance of cockpit procedures when you are not in a real cockpit, etc.
Please answer the following questions as accurately and as honestly as possible by circling
one of the seven numbers on the 7-point scale next to each question. Please do not mark
between numbers, such as 4.5.
(1) To what extent do you use mental imagery in before you drive?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all

Always

(2) When you use mental imagery, approximately how much time do you “see yourself from the
outside?”
_________% of the time
(3) Approximately how much time do you spend each week mentally practicing driving-related
tasks and procedures?
________ hours and/or _______ minutes
(4) When you are imaging, how often do you see driving procedures or maneuvers?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Always
(5) When you are imaging, how often do you see the entire drive?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all

Always

(6) When you are imaging, how detailed are the driving instruments?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Extremely
(7) When you are imaging, how detailed is the environment (e.g., traffic patterns, other cars,
weather)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Extremely
(8) Approximately how much time do you spend each week mentally practicing driving-related
tasks and procedures? Please specify in hours and/or minutes.
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APPENDIX D. TRAINING REACTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE (AFTER
JENTSCH, 1997)

93

Training Reactions Questionnaire
We are very interested in your honest reactions to the training you just received! Please answer the following
items by indicating on a scale of 1 to 6 how strongly you agree or disagree each of them.
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
1

1.

2

DISAGREE
3

AGREE
4

5

STRONGLY
AGREE
6

This program presented information and ideas that were new to me.

_______________
2.

I have enjoyed this program.
___________________

3.

I believe that the ideas presented to me in this program will be useful to me.
___________________

4.

I believe that I will be a more effective crewmember as a result of this program.
___________________

5.

I found the information presented to me in this program interesting.
___________________

6.

I plan to use the skills I have learned in this program when I fly in multi-piloted crews.
___________________

7.

I would recommend this program to others.
___________________

8.

I feel I am less likely to make mistakes in the cockpit after having participated in this training.
___________________

9.

I feel that the instructor was effective at getting the points across.
___________________

10. I would be interested in participating in a similar course in the future.
_________________
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APPENDIX E: WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TASK EXAMPLE
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APPENDIX F: SINGLE SCRIPT TUTORIAL
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APPENDIX G: TWO SCRIPTS TUTORIAL
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APPENDIX H: MENTAL SIMULATION TRAINING
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Mental Simulation Training
You are now going to participate in a mental simulation training in which you will be
asked to imagine responding to a specific scenario. Please try to imagine yourself performing the
actions you think are necessary to respond (e.g., moving, talking). Please continue when you are
ready to begin.
Imagine that you are taking out your partner for dinner at a new 5-star fancy restaurant in
town. You and your partner arrive to the restaurant and see the elegant architecture, the valet
parking, and people dressed formally. When you enter the restaurant you begin to realize that it
is not a common type of 5-star restaurant, as it presents itself differently from what you have
seen in past experiences. As you scan the place for cues you observe the following items:
• Cash registers
• Large menu board on display behind cash register
• Servers Refreshment stations (e.g., Coke or Pepsi products)
You have five minutes to determine a course of action. Please describe, as detailed as
possible, how you would respond in this situation using the items listed above. Specifically, talk
about the sequence of actions (from the moment you walk in, to the moment you leave) you
would take in order to have a successful dinner at this type of restaurant. Please inform the
experimenter when you are ready to begin.
Please indicate why you chose to respond in this way:
1. What were your assumptions about the situation?
2. What is your biggest concern about your plan of action?
3. What items from the briefing were important to you and why?
4. What would you have done differently if other restaurant items/individuals were present
or not present?
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APPENDIX I: SINGLE SCRIPT DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE TEST
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Declarative Knowledge Test (Single Script Condition)
Please answer the following items based on the information learned in the previous training
slides.
Why is the cooling system important?
a) Works to control the engine’s temperature and helps to keep it at an optimal level to avoid
overheating.
b) Helps to produces more heat to improve the engine’s efficiency.
c) Continuously increases the engine’s temperature to achieve overheating.
The temperature gauge rising towards the "hot area" is not a sign of an engine overheating.
a) True
b) False
A car may overheat because of a failure in the cooling system.
a) True
b) False
It is safe to assume that there is a failure in the cooling system if the following conditions are
met:
a) Ambient temperature between 70-84 degrees Fahrenheit
b) Driving on a flat road (no incline)
c) All of the above
What actions steps should be performed when an engine overheats due to a cooling system
failure?

a)

b)

c)
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APPENDIX J: TWO SCRIPTS DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE TEST
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Declarative Knowledge Test (Two Scripts Condition)
Please answer the following items based on the information learned in the previous
training slides.
Why is the cooling system important?
a) Works to control the engine’s temperature and helps to keep it at an optimal level to avoid
overheating.
b) Helps to produces more heat to improve the engine’s efficiency.
c) Continuously increases the engine’s temperature to achieve overheating.
The temperature gauge rising towards the "hot area" is not a sign of an engine overheating.
a) True
b) False
A car may overheat because of a failure in the coolant system or due to carrying a high load.
a) True
b) False
It is safe to assume that there is a failure in the cooling system if the following conditions are
met:
a) Ambient temperature between 70-84 degrees Fahrenheit
b) Driving on a flat road (no incline)
c) All of the above
If overheating occurs due to high load it may be due to which of the following:
a) Ambient temperature between 70-84 degrees Fahrenheit
b) Climbing up a long hill or incline in high heat (85+ degrees Fahrenheit)
c) Driving on a highway
What actions steps should be performed when an engine overheats due to a cooling system
failure?

a)

b)
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c)

What actions steps should be performed when an engine overheats due to high load?

a)

b)

c)
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APPENDIX K: ENGINE OVERHEAT SCENARIOS
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Scenario 1
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Scenario 2
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Scenario 3
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Scenario 4
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Scenario 5
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Scenario 6
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Scenario 7
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Scenario 8
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Scenario 9
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Scenario 10
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Scenario 11

128

Scenario 12
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Scenario 13
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APPENDIX L: SIMULATOR SICKNESS QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX M: SELF-EFFICACY QUESTIONNAIRE
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Self-efficacy Questionnaire
Instructions. Please answer the following items by indicating on a scale of 1 to 7 how strongly
you agree or disagree each of them.
I believe I received excellent ratings for my performance on this task.








Strongly Disagree (1)
2
3
Neither Agree nor Disagree 4
5
6
Strongly Agree 7

I am certain I handled the most difficult situations presented in this task well.

Strongly Disagree 1

2

3

Neither Agree nor Disagree 4

5

6

Strongly Agree 7
Considering the difficulty of this task and my skills, I think I did well on this task.

Strongly Disagree 1

2

3

Neither Agree nor Disagree 4

5

6

Strongly Agree 7
I believe that I performed within the top 10 % of all participants on this task.

Strongly Disagree 1

2

3

Neither Agree nor Disagree 4

5

6

Strongly Agree 7
I expected to do well on this task.

Strongly Disagree 1

2
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3
Neither Agree nor Disagree 4
5
6
Strongly Agree 7

I was confident I could do an excellent job on this task.

Strongly Disagree 1

2

3

Neither Agree nor Disagree 4

5

6

Strongly Agree 7
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